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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A parallel monitoring pilot was conducted in Texas during the November 7, 2006 election. The pilot consisted of randomly selecting direct recording electronic (DRE) equipment from a randomly chosen precinct in three Texas counties and voting test ballots on them as realistically as possible during election day.

Parallel monitoring is an auditing tool used to determine the accuracy of the DREs to record, tabulate and report votes. It is believed that if malicious code has been entered into a DRE voting system, it would be detected during parallel monitoring.

Currently there are no requirements for parallel monitoring in Texas. The three chosen counties, El Paso, Harris and Hidalgo were selected from a list of counties that volunteered to participate in the program. The selected counties provided samples of three varied DRE voting systems used in Texas, those being Diebold's AccuVote TSx, ES&S' iVotronic and Hart's eSlate.

The results of the parallel monitoring conducted for this pilot showed that the DREs performed with 100% accuracy. Only one parallel monitoring site showed an initial data entry error rate less than 0.035%. However, after the discrepancy review all votes were accounted for with 100% accuracy.

Although the monitoring results were positive, lessons were learned to improve the methodology used. The methodology used needs to provide detailed, step-by-step instructions, checklists and other tools. More human resources are necessary to avoid fatigue and to monitor more DREs. Also, the security method used to isolate and secure the devices prior to and after testing should be specified and followed more rigorously.

Some key recommendations include the following:

- Increasing the number of test team members and the number of testing teams
- Increasing the number of DREs to be monitored
- Conducting the test in at least the largest 25 counties for every major election.
- Stimulating the voluntary use of parallel monitoring by engineering the methodology so counties can sponsor such testing without conflict of interest and without large investment.
- Providing ample guidance and opportunities for public involvement both as observers and as participants in parallel monitoring.



INTRODUCTION

Parallel Testing During an Election

Parallel monitoring, also known as parallel testing, as used in this report is an election-day test performed on Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines. The test involves selecting voting devices at random from precincts selected at random, and testing them as realistically as possible during election day.

Douglas Jones, professor of Computer Science at the University of Iowa, has written extensively about security of voting systems. He notes, “It is important to avoid the possibility of communicating to the system under test any information that could allow the most corrupt possible software to learn that it is being tested. Ideally, this requires that the particular machines to be tested be selected at the last possible moment and then opened for voting at the normal time for opening the polls and closed at the normal time for closing the polls. In addition, mechanical vote entry should not be used, but real people should vote each test ballot, with at least two Observers noting either that the test script is followed exactly or noting the choices made. (A video record of the screen might be helpful.)”¹

Such testing is different from Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing that is conducted on the devices before the election. L&A tests can be performed automatically by software already in the DREs. Some counties conduct manual L&A tests as well, but corrupt software may be designed to function only on election days. Therefore such software would not be active during either automated or manual L&A testing before the election, and would not be detected by any L&A tests.

Parallel monitoring is only one of many other tests and security measures that are typically performed to ensure the integrity of a voting system. The important feature of the parallel monitoring is that it is conducted during the election.

Sources for Parallel Testing Methodology

The methodology for this pilot was modeled after California’s Parallel Monitoring Program² and information provided the Brennan Report.

Other key sources of information include the Electronic Voting Systems website of Douglas Jones at the University of Iowa³, the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project⁴, and interviews with personnel in the Travis County Election’s Division. Travis County has been conducting parallel monitoring for a number of years and a review of their method and experiences was helpful in creating a methodology.

Texas Parallel Monitoring Project Objectives

The objectives of the project were to

- Develop a prototype methodology for conducting parallel monitoring of Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems in Texas
- Evaluate methods for selecting counties, precincts, and equipment
- Evaluate scripting and testing options
- Determine where current best practice recommendations may need to be tailored for application in Texas
- Conduct a pilot test of the methodology to determine where to make improvements in staffing and training
- Evaluate the results of the test to identify costs to the counties and to the Secretary of State in implementing a parallel monitoring program
- Assess the accuracy and integrity of the voting systems that were tested



PARALLEL MONITORING METHODOLOGY

ADMINISTRATIVE METHODOLOGY

Selection of Counties

Currently there is no requirement for parallel monitoring in Texas. When the Texas Secretary of State (SOS) asked for counties to volunteer to participate in a parallel monitoring program, several large counties volunteered. The SOS chose three counties, which provided a representation of DRE voting systems from each vendor that has a system certified for use in Texas.

TABLE 1 . Counties chosen for Parallel Monitoring

County	Vendor and product
El Paso	Diebold <i>Accu-Vote TS R6</i>
Harris	Hart InterCivic <i>eSlate</i>
Hidalgo	Election Systems and Software (ES&S) <i>iVotronic</i>

Selection of Precincts

Precincts were selected by the following steps:

1. Precinct data from past two elections for each county was obtained from the Texas Legislative Council in an Excel spreadsheet.
2. Each county's precincts were sorted by registered voters and turnout in 2002, a similar mid-term election. Precincts without registered voters and turnout in that election were eliminated as candidates for testing.
3. One precinct from each county was then randomly selected from the remaining precincts using the random number function in Excel.
4. The selected counties' ballots were checked to ensure that the chosen precincts did not have split ballots. This further simplified data entry required by reducing the number of ballot styles that had to be tested.

TABLE 2. Precincts Selected for Parallel Monitoring

County	Precinct	Ballots Cast in 2002
El Paso	#0096	886
Harris	#0029	750
Hidalgo	#0039	1,123

Selection of Equipment

Two DREs from each precinct were selected for testing. This was to ensure that in case one device failed, the pilot would have a successful parallel monitoring test with at least one DRE from each of the chosen counties. The DREs were selected at random by the Team Lead from those sent to the selected precincts.

Note that two machines represent about 0.03% of the voting devices in Harris County, 0.3% of the devices in El Paso and in Hidalgo Counties. Such tiny samples cannot be said to represent the entire population of devices in any of the tested Counties.

Securing Equipment

The security procedures for the test DRE equipment was determined during the site visits. Both the pre-test and the post-test DRE security required locked storage facilities within the Election Warehouse. The pre-test DRE security procedures included verifying the serial numbers of the equipment and tamper-proof seals compared to the list of equipment issued to the precinct according to county inventory records. The post-test DRE security procedures also required application of tamper-proof seals or tags to the tested equipment.

Site Visits

Site visits were conducted Thursday and Friday, October 26 and 27 to allow team leads to become familiar with County personnel and review the testing environment. In Harris County the team lead also selected and secured the devices to be tested. The site visits focused on the following:

- Procedures for selecting the DREs and coordinating with the county's inventory procedures for their voting systems
- Facilities for securing the selected equipment
- Facilities for the test
- County protocols the test team would be expected to follow

Scripting

The test script form was designed to record details of the voting process for the test voter, to record minor errors and their corrections, to provide instructions for scripted navigation and scripted errors, and to validate selections before casting the ballot.

The test scripts attempted to mirror the actual voter experience, including such things as straight party voting, crossover votes, blank ballots, changing selections, and navigating back through the ballot. Each script allowed the Tester to select either English or Spanish as their choice of language. During the monitoring other options, as provided by the system, such as large font and/or high contrast were also used and notated on the scripts. The scripts also specified the candidates and measures the Data Entry person should select.



The average DRE in each of the selected Counties records between 50 and 100 ballots. The Brennan Report postulated that 2% to 3% of the votes for a single contest might need to be stolen to change the outcome of an election. Thus voting 50 test ballots on each machine gives the Test Team a somewhat better than 50% chance of detecting corrupt software in action if the postulate in the Brennan Report’s estimate is reasonable.⁵

Each team voted as many scripts as possible in the voting day, alternating between the two DREs at random intervals.

Selection of Test Personnel

Our Lady of the Lake University (OLLU) contributed 3 graduate students from its Masters of Science-Information Systems and Security program to perform the roles of observer and data entry operators. OLLU also contributed An OLLU professor provided his time and expertise to act as a security/auditing consultant during many aspects of the parallel monitoring effort.

Mel Mireles, CISA, CISM, CHS-III CEO, HBMG, Inc.		
Nick Osborn, HBMG, Inc. Project Lead	Art Garcia, PMP HBMG, Inc. Team lead	Terri Georgulas, PMP, HBMG, Inc. Team Lead
Liz Fisher, HBMG, Inc. Data Entry	Sam Brandon HBMG, Inc. Data Entry	Aaron Bryant, HBMG, Inc. Data Entry
Cliff Coats, HBMG, Inc. Contract Videographer	Aaron Sanders, HBMG, Inc. Videographer	Ben Columbus, HBMG, Inc. Videographer
Kevin Barton, OLLU, Observer	Ernesto Ballesteros, OLLU, Observer	Adam Arevalos, OLLU, Observer
W. Andrew Pennington, PMP, CHS-III, CISSP Director, Center for Cyber Security Policy Assistant Professor, Our Lady of the Lake University (OLLU)		

Training

General Training

General training required for all team members included the following:

- Monitoring Teams Introduction, a one-hour presentation covering the goals and purposes of parallel monitoring, specific goals of the project, introduction of the team leads and further resources the team members were to utilize in preparation for executing the tests
- Online Poll Worker Training, provided by the Texas Secretary of State⁶
- Election Day Training, A one-hour class that covered specific techniques used by the Test Teams, including
 - How the teams would prepare the test site Monday, November 6, 2006
 - Specific videography techniques and concerns
 - Call-and-response testing
 - Conduct on camera
 - Understanding and responding to County security and administrative protocols

Additional general information and other documentation provided to team members as needed included the following resources:

- Brennan Center Report⁷
- California Parallel Monitoring Report⁸
- Brennan Center Voting Technology Website⁹
- Federal Election Commission Help America Vote Act of 2002¹⁰

Team Lead Training

Team Lead training included two planning sessions (each two hours in length) in which the leads reviewed the methodology and forms to streamline the procedures. The first session focused on high-level objectives, and established goals for videotaping, security, logistics, schedule, and test methodology. The second planning session worked through the testing plan, documents, and test scripts to streamline the forms, finalize the processes for following the test scripts and finalize the activities checklist by which the tests were conducted.

Videographer Training

The videographers held a two-hour brainstorming and planning session to create a methodology that would fulfill the goals the team leads set out in their first planning session. The team leads wanted the videographers to achieve the following:

- Videotape all actions in which the equipment was selected, secured, set up for operation, closed down, and secured after the test.
- Capture a wide-angle view of the entire testing environment at all times to provide a continuous record of all DREs under the control of the testing teams.
- Capture clearly the screen of the DRE on which test votes were being cast, and ensure the audio of the interactions between the Data Entry person and the Observer were also recorded clearly.
- Maintain a log of all videotapes, including the time they began and the subject matter such as which scripts were included on the tapes.

The videographers presented their methodology to the team leads in a one-hour session in which they explained their approach and team leads made final decisions about outstanding issues.

Vendor-Specific Training

Team members received specific training and manuals for the system they would be testing. The training available for each system is listed below:

Diebold

1. Poll worker training provided by Guadalupe County on identical Diebold equipment
2. Diebold training videos
3. Training Monday 6 November 2006 by County elections personnel on setting up the equipment according to El Paso's standard procedure as documented in their poll worker's manual
4. Diebold online training materials
 - Diebold Manufacturer's Demo ¹¹
 - Diebold Voters' Demo ¹²

Hart

1. Interviewed Travis County Election Officials regarding their Parallel monitoring program using Hart equipment
2. Travis County Poll workers training
3. "The Hart Voting System Early Voting Desk Reference, System Version 6.1"
4. "Harris County Election Day eSlate Desk Reference. System Version 6.1 HC"
5. "Harris County Election Day Polling Location Administration Manual"
6. Hart online training materials:
 - Hart Demo Site ¹³
 - Electronic Voting Machine Information Sheet (Series 3000) ¹⁴
 - McLennan County eSlate Installation, eSlate Frequently Asked Questions ¹⁵

ES&S

1. ES&S training video
2. Reference materials provided by Hidalgo County:
 - ES&S iVotronic Voting System Poll Worker Checklist #1
 - ES&S iVotronic Voting System Poll Worker Checklist #2
 - Hidalgo County Early Voting Steps checklist
 - Hidalgo County Election Day Steps checklist
3. Trained on Monday, November 6, 2006 with County elections personnel on setting up the equipment according to Hidalgo's standard procedure as documented in their poll worker's technical manual

Reconciling Results Discrepancies

Discrepancies between the results tapes from the DREs and the results anticipated by the script database were reviewed to determine how and where the error was introduced and how to avoid such errors in the future.

The following process was used:

- Review the test script to determine if the script directions were incorrectly listed
- Review the test script generating tools to determine if the expected tally is indeed correct as it is being compared to the final tally
- Review the video tape captures to determine if the data entry was correct.

If the review process shows that the error was accidentally inserted into the test, then this would be recorded as an error by the Data Entry person.

If all reviews show that everything was entered correctly then this would imply an Electronic Voting System anomaly.

TECHNICAL METHODOLOGY

Videotaping

In order to ensure transparency and confirm security, the parallel monitoring was videotaped throughout the process.

Videographers at each location were equipped with two professional grade video cameras, which recorded onto high grade videotape, as well as a backup camera in the event that one of the others failed. All cameras also included microphones and were prepared to pick up audio along with the image.

The videographer used the first camera to video record the chain of custody and the security measures in place. This documented:

- Election workers relinquishing custody of the DREs
- Receipt of equipment by the Test Team
- Unbroken seals on the DREs and their numbers
- DRE serial numbers
- Securing the DREs prior to parallel monitoring

This camera then served as a wide panoramic view, showing the voting equipment and the immediate area. This camera maintained the panoramic view from the equipment set up until the equipment was sealed and secured.

The second camera was mainly used as a close up camera. After the voting equipment was obtained from the counties, this camera captured

- The serial numbers on each machine
- Set up of the equipment and testing area
- Running the zero totals tape
- Opening the polls

The camera was then positioned to be able to capture separate close ups of each DRE screen.

The video recorded

- Each script prior to data entry
- The selections entered into the DRE
- The summary review screen
- Casting the ballot.

This recording provided an efficient way to review any discrepancies detected. In addition, all closing activities were also taped. The activities included:

- Closing the polls on each DRE
- Running two copies of the results tape
- Turning off the DREs
- Applying tamper-evident seals to the DREs and to their cases
- Transferring custody of the equipment back to the county
- Securing the DREs


Everything was recorded digitally onto tape in order to acquire a clear, sharp picture. While this did provide a good quality image, it meant that tapes had to be changed approximately once an hour. Since changing the tape of the panoramic wide shot would result in a gap in time, a shooting plan was designed to have the close up camera cover the time the wide camera was not shooting. This was done by:

- Suspending data entry from the scripts
- Physically moving the close up camera back to a wide panoramic view
- Changing the tape and battery on the wide camera and starting recording again
- Physically moving the close up camera forward to the close up position
- Changing the tape and battery on the close up camera and starting recording again
- Resuming data entry from the scripts

An analog clock was set up in each location so that it was visible to the wide panoramic camera at all times and then was captured up by the close up camera when it was moved to the wide shot during tape changes. This was done in order to provide documentation of actions in reference to the time each occurred as well as provide a common link which could be used to combine the wide shots.

Through these steps a continuously recorded wide panoramic view of the area and close ups of the detailed information on the DRE screens were captured. The illustration below shows how the cameras were shifted during tape changes.

Figure 1. Changing Tapes and Close-up Camera



Execution of the Test

Timeline

The following table provides a summary of activities that occurred during the test.

Table 4. Timeline for Election Day Testing

Day	Date (2006)	Time	Activities
Monday	November 6	1300 to 1700	Test Teams meet in their respective Counties. Review and set up the testing environments, and receive instructions from the host Counties on security, County protocols, and other operational details.
Tuesday	November 7	0600	Test Team reports to the testing locations, begin setting up the voting systems.
Tuesday	November 7	0700	Polls open for voting; testing begins
Tuesday	November 7	0700 to 1900	Teams execute test scripts
Tuesday	November 7	1900	Polls close; testing ends
Tuesday	November 7	1930 to 2030	Teams take down equipment, return custody to County personnel
Wednesday	November 8	N/A	Test Teams debrief, return to home cities
Thursday thru Friday	November 9 & November 10	N/A	Team leads debrief, reconcile tally tapes with scripts

Management of the Test Roles

There were four people per Test Team. Their titles as specified in the Methodology were Team Lead, Data Entry, Observer, and Videographer. However, there were two specific positions during testing, the Data Entry person, and the Observer.

The Data Entry and Observer positions rotated among the Team Lead, Data Entry and Observer every thirty minutes to reduce fatigue and data entry errors. The person at the Observer position rotated to the Data Entry position, the person at the Data Entry position went on break, and the person on break took up the Observer position for the next thirty minutes. Under this scheme every person except the videographer participated in all test activities.

Because of the expertise required, the Videographer was not an interchangeable role.

Execution of the Scripts

Data Entry Procedures

The procedures for data entry were included on the front of each script as follows:

1. Data Entry person records the start time as shown on the test clock.
2. Data Entry person places the test script in front of the video camera so the script number is recorded.
3. Data Entry person announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.
4. Data Entry person authorizes a new ballot.
5. Data Entry person selects a language and records the language choice in the Language box above. The Data Entry person passes the script to the Observer.
6. Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure.
7. Data Entry person makes the selection on the DRE.
8. Observer checks the Voted column after the selection is made.
9. If the Data Entry person makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The Data Entry person will notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an Unscripted Error in the “Scr or Unscr Error” column on the voting script.
10. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the “Scr or Unscr Error” column. The instructions printed in the “Explanation or Instructions” column will explain how to handle the specific error. The Observer will instruct the Data Entry person how to vote the error according to the script.

Data Verification Procedures

When the Data Entry person reaches the Summary screen, the script requires these steps:

1. Data Entry person stops at the Summary screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The Data Entry person then calls out the selections as they appear on the summary screen.
 - If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the Valid column.
 - If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the “Scr or Unscr Error” column, and informs the Data Entry person of the correction that is needed.
 - The Data Entry person makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and restarts the data verification process at the beginning of the script.
2. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Data Entry person casts the ballot and records the finish time.

PARALLEL MONITORING EVALUATION

GENERAL EVALUATION

Team Configuration

The team rotation methodology provided relief from the intense concentration required for accurate data entry. However, the extremely long day produced fatigue and increased error rates later in the day.

Data Entry Methodology

The voting methodology was developed to alleviate potential data entry errors. The Observer announced the vote to select, and the Data Entry person reiterated the vote from the selection screen. Then at the Summary Screen, the Data Entry person announced the candidates that were selected and the Observer verified it from the script. The teams tried several variations about how much verbal interaction was appropriate. It appears that under most circumstances, a very small amount of verbal data needs to be exchanged between the Observer and the Data Entry person.

Sources of Error

There were two sources of possible error. One was during the learning curve initially encountered as the Test Team first implemented the test methodology. The second was as the result of fatigue.

Two of the three Test Teams tallied immediately with one hundred per cent accuracy while one had an initial error rate less than 0.035%.

After the discrepancy review, all three Test Teams' votes were accounted for with 100% accuracy. Even with this degree of redundancy, a few errors occurred, as noted on the test scripts for each test site.

Videography

The videotaping methodology seemed to work well, recording both a wide panoramic view of the testing, close up shots of the DRE screens, and audio of the interaction between the data entry person and the observer. The wide shot allowed reviewers to see the equipment being tested as well as the surrounding area. The close up camera allowed reviewers to read the text as well as hear the Data Entry persons calling out selections. Audio was captured with both cameras.

The cameramen experienced only a few minor technical problems and never had to use the back up cameras. Videography Logs were kept to track the times for tape changes and the specific Test Scripts executed on each tape.

Discrepancy Control

Discrepancy Reports were provided for Test Teams to document events interrupting the normal testing process or having the potential to affect the accuracy or integrity of the results.

Two discrepancies were reported by the Hidalgo team:

- Loss of power to the close up camera as tape not changed in time (temporary)
- Inability to print the 'zero tape' (printer not available till mid-way through test)

Four discrepancies were reported by the El Paso team:

- The DREs could not be secured November 6 due to circumstances described below
- The zero tapes were run by 7:01 AM; however, the first vote was not cast until 7:19.
- The close-up camera went into standby mode and did not record two scripts
- An error in Script 94 instructed the Data Entry person to vote for an incorrect write-in candidate

Facilities and Security

All facilities were climate controlled. Only personnel involved in the testing or having security verification were allowed access to the test area.

EL PASO/DIEBOLD

Administrative Evaluation

Voting Equipment

Diebold Accu-Vote TS R6 w/Ballot Station Version 4.5.2

Vote Card Encoder Version 1.0

Voter Cards

Securing and Preparation of System

After the site visit Friday, October 27, 2006 the decision was made to select and secure the equipment the day before the election.

The team arrived Monday November 6, 2006 and provided the county personnel with a randomly generated precinct number. County personnel prepared two additional DREs to replace the ones that would be selected from the precinct. Due to the time, the polling location, which was a public school, was closed for the day. The decision was made to minimize disruption to school officials by waiting until Tuesday morning to obtain the devices. The county personnel provided the Test Team with the list of devices, serial numbers of the devices and memory cards, and the seal numbers on each of the devices that were at the precinct.

Tuesday morning the Team Lead and Videographer traveled with county personnel to the precinct to select two DREs at random from the four in the precinct inventory. The precinct elections judge and poll workers were waiting for the team to arrive and had not attempted to set up any of the machines. The videographer taped the selection process including detailed views of seals on the devices. Two DREs were secured, including the memory cards that were already sealed in the machines. County personnel also provided two access card encoders and two access cards. The team returned to the testing location to set up the equipment.

The county's processes for accounting for the devices and seals were rigorous. The team lead decided to use the county forms rather than those of the methodology to avoid transcription errors and provide continuity of documentation for the county.

The videographer taped the team recording the seal numbers, breaking the appropriate seals to access the power switch to open the polls, replacing seal on the power switch, and running the zero totals tape. The polls opened by 7:01 AM and the team began casting test ballots at 7:19.

Videography

The videotaping in El Paso went smoothly, however, the tape change process was a little different from the proposed methodology (changing the panoramic camera tape when the close up camera tape was about half way through). A continuous wide panoramic view, was maintained through the test.

A malfunction with the close up camera occurred while recording Machine B during Scripts 79 and 80, which prevented those two scripts from being recorded. The problem resulted from the camera switching to standby power. The videographer discovered the error through a routine check of the equipment and quickly remedied it. The wide-angle camera picked up both image and audio while the close up camera was out, but the Data Entry person's choices cannot be seen from this distance. The Data Entry person and Observer recorded no discrepancies on those scripts, however. (see Appendix G – El Paso Scripts 79 and 80).

The panoramic camera provided a clear wide shot of all equipment. The analog clock was placed in the foreground of the panoramic shot without blocking any important details of the room and it was highly visible.

At the close of the test, the video captured tamper-evident seals being applied to the DREs and to the outside of the case where the DRE is stored. The seal numbers were noted on the County's chain of custody form and returned to county custody. County personnel returned the equipment to a separate, secure area to prevent the systems from accidentally mixing with the devices from the general election.

Data Entry and Verification Evaluation

All 101 scripts, each with 46 contests to be voted, were processed in El Paso County. Each machine had 50 scripts entered as cast ballots. One machine had a script that instructed the tester to cancel the ballot to imitate the steps taken when having a fleeing voter. Fleeing voter means a voter has left without casting the ballot.

The call-and-response data entry between the Data Entry person and Observer was effective for reducing data entry errors. It was found that having the Data Entry person echo the name that was actually voted helped focus attention during the latter stages of the test. Simple data errors began to occur when fatigue set in, although the call-and-response technique caught all but one of these before the Data Entry person reached the summary screen.

The Test Team took the liberty of using the large print and enhanced contrast features of the devices. Approximately 10% of the ballots used Spanish, but because the team was identifying selections by name instead of contest, voting the Spanish ballots took no longer than the English ballots.

On Script 29, Machine B was used as an ad-hoc test device by one of the project executive sponsors to determine how sensitive the machine was to touching the candidate selection box in various places.

Some scripts deliberately introduced errors. All were corrected successfully from the summary screen. However, only one non-scripted data entry error was found (script 92) during the review phase and it was corrected successfully. In several scripts during the latter stages of the test, the Data Entry person accidentally touched the summary screen on a contest, causing the DRE to return to the contest as though the voter had decided to review or change the vote. This required the review cycle to start over at the beginning and review all votes again.

Reconciliation of Discrepancies

There were no tally discrepancies to resolve. However, scripted and unscripted errors that could be corrected before the ballot was cast are noted on the scripts. Ten unscripted errors occurred in nine ballots.

HARRIS/HART

Administrative Evaluation

Voting Equipment

Hart eSlate Version 2.0.13

JBC Version 2.2.

Securing and Preparation of System

During the site visit Friday, October 27, 2006, the decision was made to select and secure the equipment on that day to avoid having to arrange pickup at the random precinct on the day of the election. Voting equipment for all precincts had already been tested, sealed, separated and secured in a locked warehouse and were ready for distribution to the polling sites.

Harris County does not assign specific eSlates to polling locations before shipping them because the eSlates do not need to be preprogrammed. The shipping crew records the serial numbers of the eSlates delivered to each precinct when removed from the delivery truck.

Harris County's rule is that there are always two activated Judge's Booth Controllers (JBC) available at the polling site. These are annotated as 'primary' and 'secondary' JBCs. The secondary JBC is a backup system, which is operational and ready for use in the event of catastrophic failure in the primary JBC.

Harris County further mitigates risk of equipment failure by assigning two backup JBCs and two backup eSlates. Therefore, each precinct polling site has a primary JBC, a secondary JBC, a number of eSlates as needed, two backup JBCs, and two backup eSlates.

The Team Lead advised county personnel of the randomly selected precinct. The team randomly chose two Judge's Booth Controllers (JBC) from selected precinct's assigned equipment and randomly chose two eSlates from racks of eSlates bound for polling locations.

Backup JBCs were acquired from Harris County's inventory of emergency backup JBCs known as the "Ready Pool." These are used to replace faulty machines in the precincts. Two JBCs were pulled at random from the Ready Pool. These were emergency backup JBCs for the test's primary and secondary JBCs. Two emergency backup eSlates were also randomly chosen from the racks of eSlates bound for polling locations .

At the Elections Warehouse the database software used to manage the inventory was used to move the primary and secondary JBCs from their existing precinct into a new precinct created specifically for this test, "SOS". All machines including backups were assigned to the SOS precinct.

The equipment was then placed into a secure room. There are 2 keys for this room. One held by the Manager of the Elections Warehouse and the other held by the Office Manager.

At the close of the Parallel monitoring Test, the primary JBC seal was broken and the MBB serial number was verified. While this was not part of the methodology, the team lead decided it was important to verify this information completely. The MBB was then reinserted into the JBC and sealed. A new tamper-evident seal was placed on the JBC, and two (2) more tamper-evident seals were placed on the primary and secondary eSlates. Another seal was placed on the outer box of the JBC to provide further security.

The equipment seal numbers were annotated and the equipment was returned to the locked room.

Videography

The videographer in Harris county encountered few problems during the parallel monitoring process. The cameraman widened the close up camera in between scripts to view a letter (A or B) which identified the booth being used. In addition, the cameraman intermittently captured the clock with the close up camera to increase the transparency of the process.

Data Entry and Verification Evaluation

Harris County had a large ballot to be voted. Of 101 test scripts prepared for the county,

- 88 scripts were entered with 98 voted entries per script
- 8,624 individual contests were voted
- 3 discrepancy errors were reported, as noted below, for an error rate less than .035%

The discrepancy errors were clustered in 4 major ways.

- Ballots #44, #51, and #53. The cluster shows errors beginning to occur half way through the testing one (1) before and two (2) after lunch.
- The errors all occurred on the 4th of 5 pages in the test script. These were errors for the 61st entry of 98 entries (62% complete), 68th/98 (69% complete), and 84th/98 (85% complete).
- The errors occurred during the highest concentration of single candidate choices being voted.
- Errors for the 61st, 68th, and 84th entries were all for a single (no other choice was given) Republican candidate, where the candidate choice was mistakenly not voted. In each case, there was a tendency to highlight the field above the name and miss the name.

Reconciliation of Discrepancies

Seven ballots had eight unscripted errors. Four of the errors were corrected during initial data entry, four were corrected from the Summary Screen.

The final analysis showed that all votes were accounted for. However, the results tape did not match the expected results. Three candidates did not have the correct number of votes expected according to the scripts.

The video tapes were reviewed to resolve each of the issues. The missing votes were verified as data entry errors on scripts #44, #51, and #53. The errors all occurred on the 4th of 5 pages in the test script, and all were for a single (no other choice was given) Republican candidate, where the candidate choice was mistakenly not voted. In each case, there was a tendency to highlight the field above the name and miss the name.

HIDALGO/ES&S

Administrative Evaluation

Voting Equipment

ES&S iVontronic Version 8.0.1.0

Personal Electronic Ballot (PEB) Version 1.07

Securing and Preparation of System

During the site visit of Friday, October 27, it was decided to select and secure the equipment the day before the election because not all precincts' equipment had been delivered at that time.

The team arrived Monday, November 6, 2006 and provided the County personnel with a randomly generated precinct number for testing. County personnel prepared two iVontronic systems and PEBs to replace the equipment the project team would select for testing. The replacement iVontronics were stored at the precinct in a mobile cage (Red) secured by two locks.

Video documentation of the team's arrival at the precinct, exchanges of voting machines, and re-securing of exchanged voting machines was conducted.

Following the precinct iVontronic exchange, the team returned to the county warehouse, the equipment was rechecked to ensure the serial and seal numbers corresponded to the list of equipment at the precinct, and then locked, again, in a metal cage (Green). The metal cage was further sealed with numbered tamper-resistant tape to counter against any tampering. Again, all activities of securing the voting machines, including capturing serial and seal numbers was videotaped.

All security mechanisms (metal cage, locks, seal) put in place the night before were still valid.

Videography

Although the videotaping in Hidalgo was successful as well, there was one camera problem. A battery on the wide panoramic camera went out, resulting in a loss of a few minutes of footage. The malfunction was resolved quickly, but did result in a gap in the wide panoramic view, which was noted on the video log. The close up camera performed well and captured the script entries.

All security mechanisms (metal cage, locks, seal) put in place the night before were still valid.

Data Entry and Verification Evaluation

The Hidalgo County test team reported the following:

- 87 scripts were entered with 29 voted entries per script
- 2,523 individual contests were voted
- 13 unscripted errors were reported, for an error rate less than .515%

Reconciliation of Discrepancies

There were no tally discrepancies to resolve.

PARALLEL MONITORING METHODOLOGY RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This section summarizes key recommendations the Test Teams identified for improving the methodology and its execution.

APPROPRIATE SAMPLE SIZE

Appropriate Number of Counties

It is recommended that parallel monitoring be conducted in at least the largest 25 counties (70% of the vote) for every major election. Such monitoring will provide a deterrent to tampering with voting systems because the large concentrations of DREs will be monitored.

It is not feasible for the Secretary of State to conduct its own tests by randomly selecting counties the day before the election if the counties are expected to provide facilities for securing the devices testing them on election day. Notifying counties in advance of the test essentially nullifies the purpose of such random selection, however. If counties are conducting such monitoring on their own, it is possible for the Secretary to send observers to monitor some of the tests at random.

Therefore it is recommended that counties host the monitoring, primarily by providing a location in the county offices in which to hold the test, and by providing security such as constables or sheriff's deputies for the test. However, the monitoring project should be managed and staffed by entities not related to nor dependent on the county, such as a universities, public interest groups, political parties, or independent contractors.

Appropriate Number of Precincts

At present it is recommended that precincts be selected at random for testing using the methodology explained earlier. This test assigned precincts and their subsequent DREs at random to follow industry recommendations. However, if the Test Team has reason to suspect that an attacker intends to and has the opportunity and resources to target specific precincts, the best strategy would be to test precincts that have characteristics favorable to stealing votes for the suspected attacker.

Appropriate Number of Devices

This report cannot recommend a formula for calculating the appropriate number of DREs to test. The Brennan report provides a formula for calculating the number of test machines based on an anticipated infection rate. However, the formula does not include other factors that may significantly increase the number of DREs required to be tested. It is suggested that a detailed study be conducted by operations management statisticians to determine what a statistically valid number of tests should be.

Current reported implementations of parallel monitoring seem to assume that all of the devices in a county are infected. Thus testing one or two devices is considered enough of a sample to demonstrate whether or not any machines in a county are compromised.

This assumption of 100% infection relies on a further assumption that the corrupt code was created by a disgruntled employee of the vendor, or someone who has access to the code and a development environment nearly identical to the vendor's. In addition, such hackers must have an opportunity to infect all the machines in a county by a tactic such as slipping the infection in through a trusted upgrade from the vendor. In this way all county machines would be upgraded and infected at the same time.

If the corrupt programs must be inserted secretly rather than by an open upgrade, the hackers may not have the opportunity to infect all the machines in a county. If the parallel Test Team cannot be sure that all machines are infected, they must test a greater number of devices depending on the assumed infection rate. The lower the suspected infection rate, the greater the number of tests that must be run to determine whether or not the general population of devices has any corrupt devices. Further, industry analysts note that there is a distinct possibility that corrupt code may have features that detect if the device is being tested. If it is likely that any infected machines can detect testing and turn off the vote harvesting features, the test should increase the number of test devices by the proportion of test situations in which they anticipate the software will be successful in detecting the test. The test ballots must also match "typical" ballots even more closely, as discussed below.

Appropriate Number of Ballots

It is recommended that at least fifty ballots should be cast per DRE, and preferably as many as 100. The Brennan Report postulates that hackers may want to steal 2% of the vote, or about one vote for every 50 ballots.¹⁶ If this postulate is true, a test deck of greater than 50 ballots would likely generate at least one stolen vote provided that the software did not recognize that it was being tested.

Creating Ballot Scripts

Using Data from a Previous Election

It is recommended that results from a similar prior election be used as a basis for designing test scripts. Contact the Legislative Council for election data for each race for each selected precinct. Analyze the data to determine the following:

- Total number of straight party votes for each party;
- Straight party votes as a percentage of all ballots cast;
- Drop-off rates after straight party votes have been deducted;
- Party association with ballot measures and initiatives

In addition, if the test team has access to actual Cast Vote Records (individual ballots) from the election, the percentage of crossover votes can be calculated by each position on the ballot. Finally, note the instances in which down-ballot races such as constable or justice of the peace have much lower than expected drop-off rates because of unknown or unpredictable local political dynamics.

Adapt the findings to the current ballot according to the following rules:

1. Maintain the straight party voting percentages for the new ballot scripts. If crossover vote statistics are available, use these to add crossovers to match the past election's ratio. If they are not available, allocate zero to two crossover votes per straight party ballot.
2. Maintain approximately the same drop-off rate for non-straight party ballots. If possible, include any expected anomalies for down-ballot races caused by local politics.
3. Vote measures according to predicted party affiliation unless indicated otherwise by local dynamics.

This test used machine-generated ballots for the tests. The ballots were based on party voting patterns observed in prior elections in the Counties. They were randomized by creating voter profiles based on the party patterns that allowing various percentages of randomly selected crossover votes and no-votes.

The machine-generated ballots are much easier to produce and reconcile than human-generated ballots. However, before making a definitive recommendation on this topic the team needs to analyze real ballots from the precincts to determine if the automated ballot generation can be improved to simulate actual voting patterns more accurately.

Public Participation

It is not recommended that the general public be allowed to actually touch the devices that are being tested. Such participation is advocated by some researchers, but it may give perpetrators of corrupt software a way to physically participate in the test and introduce a "secret knock" to turn off the software.

FORMAT OF METHODOLOGY

It is recommended that the format of the methodology be more prescriptive and provide more planning and execution tools.

Project Management Focus

The methodology should structure the monitoring as a project including key project management features such as delineating clear lines of authority, specific deliverables and timelines.

Clear Definition of Roles and Training

The functional roles should be described more thoroughly and include additional groups not directly involved in testing. The descriptions should then be specifically associated with the training that is needed in order to reduce the amount of time any individual participant may spend over-preparing for the test.

Specific Tasks and Timelines

The methodology should be managed through a chronological checklist of specific actions that should be accomplished. Each step in the checklist should have a list of forms, references, planning tools, resources, training needed, stakeholders who are affected, and other key information needed to coordinate the steps.

ROLES AND TRAINING

Clear definition of roles, responsibilities and training are important to the success of the test, and become increasingly important as the scope of the test increases. The following are suggested role definitions that may be expanded further in the final methodology.

Project Manager

The Project Manager (PM) is responsible for managing the schedule and resources, providing training, and ensuring stakeholders are involved and informed. The PM may be responsible for several precinct Test Teams when extensive testing is required. Training and experience should include several years of project management experience, preferably in environments with numerous, competing stakeholders such as political parties. Training specific to parallel monitoring may be achieved after the PM is appointed, and should include the history and technical background of the voting systems to be tested, current state of the art of parallel monitoring, and some public relations guidance for handling intense public interest that an extended test regimen would generate.

Shift Leader

Shift Leaders are responsible for the test environment including managing the Data Entry persons, Observers, and Videographers, ensuring smooth transitions between shifts, security and comfort of the testing room, and other facilities issues.

The Shift Leader may have, but is not required to have project management experience. Background as a line or staff manager in a corporation or government agency would likely be sufficient. Training should include extensive poll worker instruction, especially in maintaining security and order. The Shift Leader should also be trained in the data entry techniques the Data Entry person and Observer will be using, and how script exceptions should be evaluated and reported so that an adequate written record of the test is maintained. Finally, the Shift Leader should be able to evaluate the quality of the video and give guidance to the videographer as necessary.

When possible, a Deputy Shift Leader should be trained to allow for absences of the Shift Leader due to illness, personal emergencies, or break times.

Data Entry Personnel

The Data Entry personnel should be trained in using the specific DRE voting system, including how to change screen resolution and contrast, how to select languages, how to navigate around the ballot and summary screen, and any other common voter and poll worker actions related to the DREs. The training should be conducted in the county in which the testing will occur. If possible it should occur at the time poll worker training is administered to minimize the impact on county personnel.

In addition, the training should include specific instructions about how to execute script instructions on the specific equipment. For instance, a script may ask the Data Entry person to vote for one candidate then return to the contest from the summary screen and change the vote to a different candidate. The Data Entry personnel should understand how to translate such instructions into actions specific to the DRE on which they are voting.

Videographer

Videographers are responsible for capturing the entire parallel monitoring process on video as well as protecting and maintaining the camera equipment.

Cameramen should have experience shooting with professional video cameras and be able to record with two cameras simultaneously while controlling focus and exposure, as well as maintaining AC or battery power and video tapes. Because of long running times, they should be knowledgeable of camera maintenance should a problem occur. In addition, videographers should be trained on voting equipment, especially pertaining to setting up and closing down, as they will be capturing these steps in order to preserve transparency.

County Observers

County personnel may attend the tests as County Observers. Therefore it is recommended that they follow much the same training path as the shift leader to be able to communicate effectively with the project leader and shift leader if necessary.

Media and the General Public

It is recommended that the media and public be allowed as much access to training materials and other sources of information as possible. Such access should be subject only to those restrictions necessary to protect the security and/or proprietary information of the voting systems. For instance, video in which passwords are entered should be redacted from the publicly available version. In some cases it may be advisable to request media representatives to attend some of the same training as project personnel so the media can report accurately on the tests.

PERSONNEL COSTS

Approximate costs for testing a single DRE are estimated in personnel clock hours in the table below. The project assumes two 6-hour shifts with four testers/observers each. These estimates do not include a project manager. For a small project testing just one DRE, the project manager may be one of the Shift Leaders.

At this time it is estimated that the project manager will expend as much effort as a shift leader for each DRE that is tested. Thus a Shift Leader who is also a project manager for a one-DRE test would spend approximately 60 hours, but the time would be spread out over several weeks.

Function	Opening Shift Leader	Closing Shift Leader	Testers (8)	Opening Videographer	Closing Videographer
Training					
Quality Assurance for Elections	2	2			
Voting Systems Technical	4	4			
Parallel Testing Methodology	2	2		2	2
County Pollworker and Tech Training	2	2	8	2	2
Managing the Test (with Team)	2	2	16	2	2
Total Training	12	12	24	6	6
Testing					
Select Precincts and Secure DREs	2	2		2	
Setup Equipment, Open Polls	2		4	2	
Administer Test	6	6	48	6	6
Close Polls, Secure DREs		2	4		2
Total Testing	10	10	54	10	8
Evaluation					
Reconcile Results Tapes	2	2			2
Debrief with Testing Team	1	1	8	1	1
Debrief with Project Lead	2	2			
Total Evaluation	5	5	8	1	3
TOTAL Clock Hours	27	27	86	17	17
Overhead at 10%	3	3	9	2	2
TOTAL Clock Hours plus Overhead	30	30	95	19	19

Total clock hours for testing single DRE is estimated to be approximately 193 hours, or 223 hours if the project manager's time is included.

STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT OF TEST TEAMS

Security Clearance

The project manager, team leads, and writer(s) for final document(s), and other key personnel should have criminal background checks. If only one or two tests are being conducted, it may be feasible for all team members to have background checks.

Staffing the Teams

The parallel monitoring test requires a minimum 14-hour day. Thus the testing group for a single precinct needs at least two teams with four Data Entry persons or three teams with three Data Entry persons each. Teams should be composed of a mix from the volunteer pools, ensuring that no single organization could collaborate to influence test results.

It is recommended that the Test Team have two Shift Leaders, an Opener and a Closer.

The Opener is responsible for setting up the machines, opening the polls, running the zero tapes, and supervising the voting through about 1:30 PM. The Closer works from 1:00 PM to about 9:00 PM, supervises the second half of voting, closes the polls, runs the results tapes, secures the machines, collects all testing artifacts and returns them to the project manager. This schedule minimizes administrative errors arising from fatigue, and provides additional integrity from separation of duties.

All personnel except the Shift Leader and Videographer rotate through the data entry and observing positions. The Shift Leaders will be responsible for managing the entire testing environment including the Test Team and its documentation, the public viewing area, any media that may attend, security personnel, and any facility functions such as air conditioning and lighting.

SECURING VOTING EQUIPMENT

Selecting and securing the equipment to test is one of the most sensitive aspects of parallel monitoring because it impinges on the county's resources.

Site Visits

It is recommended that all project managers and shift leaders conduct a pre-test site visit to the counties that will be tested. The visit should include discussion of the way the counties track their inventories, how they select which DREs go to each precinct, the timetable for delivering DREs to the precincts, and other important parameters. This information should be used to negotiate the time and procedures for selecting and securing machines before election day.

A second and equally important goal is to determine how to minimize impact on the county's operations before and during the test.

Options for Securing DREs

Storage Location

There is no specific recommendation about where to store the selected DREs prior to the test. In many cases counties already have facilities with sufficient security to store the DREs. However, in certain circumstances it may be advisable to arrange for storage of the machines at a third-party site that stakeholders feel may be more secure or independent. Such locations would have to be negotiated among the county, the test team and any project stakeholders that for various reasons have expressed strong interests in assuring the impartiality and honesty of the test.

Securing the Storage Location

The Test Team should work with the county personnel in charge of the warehouse to arrange proper storage with limited access. Such storage requires a secure locked room to which only the warehouse manager and/or other limited personnel have the key. Access to the storage area should be logged through the automated security system or a manual logging system. The logs should be reviewed prior to removing the devices from secure storage to determine if the machines may have been subject to tampering and need to be left in storage for forensic examination.

Secure Storage Cages

The Test Team may provide its own secure storage cage in which to house the devices until election day. This provides an additional assurance that no one but the team has the keys to the cage. This tactic may work well when only a few DREs are to be tested. If the tests involve many precincts and devices, however, it is likely to be infeasible for the test group to provide enough cages, or for the County to have enough room in a secure storage area for such cages.

Seals and Locks

The Test Team should have its own sequentially numbered and controlled seals and tags with which to seal devices and if necessary, access points such as doors. The seals should also have a log so that each seal can be traced to its use and destruction.

Some Counties use bankers' bags to secure peripheral devices or memory cards. It is advisable that the Test Teams also be equipped with their own bankers' bags and unique keys so the contents cannot be easily tampered with while in storage.

Each warehouse is unique, so it is also advised that the team consult with the County personnel to determine if it is advisable to use the team's own locks for the cages, or have the door locks re-keyed to provide an additional layer of security for the duration of the test.

Security Camera at the Storage Site

Security cameras for the warehouse are a best practice that is recommended in all situations. If the warehouse is already equipped with security cameras, the selected devices should be stored within view of the cameras, or the secure closet in which they are stored should be within view of the security cameras at all times.

Prior to the test the Team Lead and Videographer should review the recordings to determine that no one has accessed the devices or the storage area without authorization, and the access has been logged and the video matches the logs. If there are discrepancies, the team lead may have to decide whether the machines may have been subject to tampering and need to be left in storage as evidence.

In some cases the Test Team may rent security cameras specifically to monitor the storage areas. However, the added expense for such an extreme, short-term tactic would have to be justified by the sensitivity and criticality of the test results.

Other Security Measures

Automated access control using access cards, biometric authorization, or other means are also a best practice that should be adopted wherever feasible. This approach reduces the human error introduced by manual logging and security guards. In addition, it is suggested that inventories be tagged with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips. This technology will enable warehouse personnel to track all inventory items more securely, and also enable the Test Team to monitor the secured machines more reliably. The RFID tags should be affixed directly to DRE machines, not their carrying cases.

VIDEOGRAPHY

Equipment

It is recommended that the recordings be made directly to hard disk which would avoid the problems associated with changing tapes. One way to accomplish this would be by shooting with the same type of camera used in this project (ENG- MiniDV) and recording directly to a video ready computer. Recording directly to computer allows the test team to create DVDs for distribution or for backup immediately after the test to ensure integrity of the video record.

Another solution would be to record using a closed circuit or CCTV system. Such a system may have multiple cameras connected to one digital recorder. The recordings will be much easier to navigate than separate recordings on a computer if they have to be used to resolve discrepancies in the tallies. However, if it is determined that a CCTV system is too costly, a combination of ENG cameras and surveillance cameras might be more practical. For instance, a lower quality surveillance camera could monitor the area and provide transparency while high quality ENG cameras captured close ups of the DRE screens as was done in this test.

Each DRE being tested should have a dedicated close-up camera. This allows the team to alternate between voting devices at random without requiring the videographer to move and refocus the camera each time. The cameras should be mounted from the ceiling or another high point in the testing area so the voter has room to move yet will not get in the way of the camera.

Procedure

A viewer of the footage shot during the parallel monitoring process may not be familiar with the equipment and/or procedures, and the set-up the Counties have in place. Therefore, it would be advantageous to have the team leader narrate what is happening step by step as they are going through the process of obtaining the equipment from the County, set-up, break-down, sealing and secure hand-off of the voting equipment back to the Counties. This will make the actions on tape much more transparent and coherent to the uninitiated viewer.

EARLY VOTING

It is not recommended that early voting be monitored because it would require such a large investment of resources. The same resources could be better used to monitor multiple DREs during election day and result in a greater chance of detecting corrupt software.

The canonical parallel monitoring regimen requires test to look as much like a real election as possible. A test of an early voting machine would require that most, if not all, ballot styles be voted on a single DRE. Further, the voting patterns should match those of early voting in general, and maybe match the voting location if the suspected corrupt code has been engineered to be sensitive to this aspect of its environment.

A further complicating factor is that the devices should be used daily throughout early voting, and often sporadically. For all practical purposes this means that a Test Team must be available to test the early voting devices at intervals every day for the entire period prior to the election, and intensively on the last day or two of voting.

Finally, the devices must be closed down properly every evening and secured for the night as well as opened again at the proper time the following morning.

PUBLIC OBSERVATION

Public observation of the parallel monitoring test is a vital component of the testing as it increases the transparency of the test.

Facilities

It is recommended that facilities for testing be large enough to provide working space for the Test Team, and a public viewing area suitable for the number of public observers anticipated by the county. The facilities should also provide enough space between the public and Test Team to ensure that the team's concentration is not disturbed by actions of the public.

Public Monitors

Large TVs or flat-panel screens connected to the close-up cameras can be used to provide the public access to everything the Data Entry person/Observer sees. The experience with the pilot also indicates that the cameras can also provide audio of all the interactions among the team members, and this should also be made available to the public.

Security

It is recommended that at least one police, sheriff, constable, or other law enforcement personnel be assigned to the public test facility from the time the team arrives until they leave.

Testing at Voting Locations

It is not recommended that testing be done at voting locations. Some experts advocate conducting the tests at actual polling sites in order to stimulate voter interest. It seems that this tactic may introduce confusion at the polling site, and might even be a security risk to the polling site and to the testing environment.

Posting of Results

Since the public and media may be heavily involved in the next round of tests, the final tally tapes should be checked against the expected results as soon as possible. The results should not be released until the complete evaluation/reconciliation has been done.

APPENDIX A

Precinct Voting Data

Source: Texas Legislative Council

El Paso County 2002 General Election

	Registered Voters	Turnout
0141	3,851	881
0119	3,737	921
0160	3,683	1,101
0110	3,492	899
0022	2,968	1,505
0087	2,932	935
0117	2,909	794
0122	2,887	886
0153	2,869	818
0055	2,844	912
0159	2,840	843
0035	2,782	749
0124	2,766	854
0094	2,755	1,280
0090	2,710	1,290
0144	2,703	757
0049	2,689	723
0093	2,682	1,062
0127	2,676	763
0133	2,668	720
0009	2,657	1,149
0014	2,654	912
0047	2,628	720
0104	2,627	804
0138	2,622	712
0056	2,603	862
0061	2,593	741
0140	2,583	740
0132	2,575	773
0057	2,574	1,268
0066	2,569	850
0102	2,559	1,028
0010	2,553	700

	Registered Voters	Turnout
0044	2,535	881
0082	2,518	752
0072	2,516	737
0080	2,516	733
0092	2,496	913
0020	2,459	1,020
0068	2,451	929
0016	2,450	1,218
0103	2,448	884
0017	2,442	920
0154	2,432	656
0112	2,423	751
0060	2,410	700
0100	2,404	782
0008	2,386	1,328
0118	2,383	625
0041	2,365	865
0040	2,350	555
0137	2,339	664
0098	2,315	815
0125	2,315	638
0053	2,313	924
0115	2,304	640
0019	2,299	1,165
0108	2,296	942
0156	2,288	609
0109	2,284	544
0126	2,261	598
0063	2,249	674
0128	2,232	619
0007	2,227	1,017
0011	2,207	803
0134	2,206	512

	Registered Voters	Turnout
0048	2,200	867
0042	2,182	631
0139	2,150	626
0051	2,135	548
0012	2,098	798
0036	2,094	629
0096	2,086	886
0152	2,071	476
0064	2,069	655
0099	2,056	824
0105	2,056	733
0050	2,048	698
0069	2,036	753
0147	2,020	922
0045	2,004	532
0083	1,978	640
0075	1,975	683
0157	1,970	480
0023	1,968	674
0149	1,967	523
0113	1,942	664
0158	1,940	717
0143	1,929	568
0052	1,927	747
0106	1,859	828
0129	1,837	510
0033	1,835	887
0095	1,826	714
0031	1,822	996
0058	1,810	819
0002	1,801	526
0034	1,800	626
0120	1,800	623
0018	1,788	858
0101	1,743	799
0145	1,714	548
0116	1,709	576
0013	1,696	770
0091	1,671	689

	Registered Voters	Turnout
0155	1,664	516
0078	1,645	440
0088	1,635	855
0024	1,611	748
0135	1,604	449
0004	1,554	482
0107	1,551	604
0131	1,514	467
0070	1,512	470
0081	1,493	496
0114	1,474	496
0025	1,454	605
0165	1,454	445
0136	1,433	377
0003	1,432	438
0148	1,405	359
0067	1,389	426
0073	1,382	616
0043	1,371	393
0086	1,360	131
0054	1,344	445
0027	1,323	615
0015	1,320	575
0123	1,300	406
0074	1,297	463
0059	1,295	284
0005	1,288	370
0030	1,286	588
0076	1,267	538
0130	1,262	410
0151	1,248	301
0071	1,242	422
0097	1,230	345
0001	1,217	374
0006	1,077	610
0021	1,070	617
0039	1,065	326
0150	1,042	220
0029	1,008	267



	Registered Voters	Turnout
0077	849	231
0161	830	286
0089	785	402
0037	749	303
0038	736	253
0142	700	184
0032	619	173
0079	618	164
0065	490	196
0146	453	101
0026	436	114
0111	424	107
0062	411	41
0167	342	136
0046	214	70
0028	199	52
0121	199	49
0084	184	9
0162	112	37
0169	57	23
0164	12	2
0168	11	1
0085	4	1
0166	0	1
0163	0	0

Harris County 2002 General Election

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0772	5,865	2,923
0609	4,734	2,045
0688	4,595	2,310
0112	4,444	1,880
0618	4,359	1,388
0734	4,341	1,975
0548	4,197	1,516
0124	4,182	2,027
0643	4,163	1,463
0362	4,140	1,820
0351	4,081	1,989
0764	4,065	1,544
0662	4,035	1,958
0619	4,009	1,905
0486	4,003	1,952
0495	3,933	1,526
0484	3,887	1,880
0654	3,826	1,459
0260	3,800	1,779
0516	3,796	1,635
0804	3,794	1,492
0649	3,788	1,310
0651	3,724	1,494
0557	3,724	1,296
0586	3,698	1,223
0551	3,688	1,548
0828	3,673	1,936
0697	3,669	1,181
0605	3,646	1,225
0466	3,639	1,768
0534	3,627	1,414
0045	3,620	1,059
0420	3,618	1,631
0463	3,617	1,250
0655	3,613	1,398
0813	3,612	1,254
0074	3,586	2,013
0601	3,565	1,761

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0485	3,558	1,470
0672	3,556	1,479
0640	3,492	1,295
0682	3,489	1,229
0722	3,486	1,361
0286	3,465	1,598
0338	3,465	1,171
0642	3,459	1,739
0617	3,428	1,298
0614	3,407	1,349
0709	3,386	1,486
0340	3,372	1,547
0718	3,341	1,740
0119	3,327	1,371
0197	3,313	1,052
0660	3,311	1,338
0521	3,309	1,272
0515	3,301	1,766
0387	3,301	1,226
0482	3,294	1,302
0353	3,292	1,113
0093	3,292	931
0568	3,280	1,699
0480	3,258	1,440
0659	3,247	1,297
0156	3,240	1,358
0612	3,233	1,537
0416	3,224	1,231
0674	3,220	1,409
0149	3,220	1,248
0469	3,213	1,749
0079	3,212	1,042
0524	3,206	1,213
0414	3,193	1,228
0633	3,169	1,656
0635	3,158	1,218
0542	3,155	1,150
0558	3,145	1,200

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0080	3,140	1,256
0514	3,119	1,393
0312	3,112	1,398
0422	3,106	1,107
0522	3,100	1,475
0805	3,097	1,508
0512	3,081	1,008
0110	3,077	1,315
0468	3,077	1,007
0638	3,072	1,075
0213	3,066	1,985
0357	3,062	1,415
0318	3,059	1,415
0552	3,058	1,654
0620	3,049	1,132
0234	3,042	1,917
0523	3,022	1,388
0518	3,021	1,257
0657	3,019	1,119
0751	3,015	1,264
0478	3,014	1,394
0474	3,012	1,239
0359	3,002	846
0450	2,994	1,013
0517	2,994	969
0256	2,990	1,335
0760	2,986	1,569
0097	2,984	1,304
0664	2,983	752
0129	2,970	1,766
0204	2,968	1,591
0506	2,967	1,369
0529	2,965	1,323
0658	2,962	1,152
0765	2,954	1,106
0006	2,950	1,093
0553	2,950	1,023
0565	2,950	710

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0673	2,949	1,300
0259	2,939	1,414
0398	2,932	1,196
0163	2,926	953
0563	2,919	1,542
0510	2,917	1,290
0588	2,910	1,221
0090	2,906	1,508
0647	2,902	927
0223	2,896	1,079
0307	2,895	1,627
0645	2,884	1,253
0413	2,875	1,374
0490	2,875	1,345
0670	2,871	1,495
0199	2,864	1,458
0418	2,862	1,011
0494	2,860	761
0364	2,858	1,140
0169	2,857	839
0459	2,855	1,412
0462	2,854	1,415
0347	2,851	1,023
0644	2,850	1,178
0849	2,845	1,109
0300	2,843	1,025
0352	2,822	830
0616	2,815	1,307
0656	2,807	1,028
0333	2,804	1,314
0200	2,795	1,504
0036	2,791	1,111
0276	2,791	959
0454	2,785	946
0500	2,784	1,217
0436	2,777	1,371
0407	2,767	1,398
0600	2,759	1,053



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0109	2,751	866
0354	2,746	1,110
0669	2,742	1,448
0302	2,742	953
0182	2,740	1,612
0508	2,740	938
0029	2,740	750
0027	2,738	1,031
0363	2,736	913
0428	2,735	807
0513	2,734	1,625
0404	2,730	1,068
0519	2,729	1,157
0252	2,728	995
0095	2,722	1,585
0739	2,715	952
0440	2,711	1,627
0435	2,708	1,519
0477	2,708	1,283
0481	2,707	1,255
0180	2,706	956
0377	2,704	1,146
0221	2,702	1,092
0823	2,699	930
0356	2,698	1,404
0622	2,685	992
0158	2,670	947
0800	2,669	1,269
0431	2,669	765
0650	2,667	1,383
0108	2,667	841
0461	2,663	1,554
0375	2,663	776
0152	2,661	789
0174	2,652	1,471
0241	2,648	700
0451	2,639	1,616
0253	2,639	778
0015	2,638	1,617
0721	2,636	1,329

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0278	2,630	1,144
0881	2,629	956
0132	2,628	1,081
0147	2,626	1,075
0768	2,624	1,277
0386	2,619	1,089
0564	2,613	1,141
0631	2,609	1,287
0476	2,607	1,111
0046	2,605	740
0219	2,592	1,127
0634	2,591	888
0287	2,585	1,434
0274	2,582	1,392
0842	2,581	924
0611	2,568	864
0057	2,566	1,303
0520	2,564	856
0545	2,562	1,188
0076	2,556	1,095
0641	2,556	1,054
0267	2,552	919
0716	2,552	864
0294	2,551	1,001
0671	2,550	979
0627	2,546	890
0399	2,544	948
0116	2,543	1,585
0603	2,543	992
0576	2,543	901
0604	2,533	976
0559	2,522	918
0824	2,522	871
0111	2,519	1,215
0211	2,517	888
0087	2,516	1,590
0492	2,514	1,238
0465	2,511	1,179
0745	2,510	1,286
0220	2,502	719



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0301	2,499	719
0525	2,498	1,309
0814	2,498	862
0853	2,496	1,267
0013	2,494	1,190
0303	2,482	1,660
0396	2,469	1,020
0017	2,456	1,225
0288	2,454	985
0224	2,451	1,342
0240	2,448	945
0596	2,447	787
0208	2,444	935
0271	2,441	1,075
0384	2,434	1,035
0541	2,433	976
0566	2,428	902
0217	2,426	1,512
0626	2,418	1,188
0509	2,411	1,126
0720	2,410	1,045
0848	2,410	1,031
0270	2,399	1,099
0311	2,394	1,112
0547	2,390	950
0411	2,387	585
0479	2,384	1,272
0452	2,382	914
0157	2,382	760
0040	2,376	1,413
0266	2,375	848
0747	2,374	735
0578	2,366	1,241
0419	2,362	1,025
0165	2,357	1,196
0417	2,357	910
0572	2,350	1,044
0062	2,350	771
0050	2,341	925
0851	2,336	914

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0113	2,335	1,250
0639	2,329	995
0206	2,326	787
0103	2,321	774
0105	2,313	643
0092	2,311	1,274
0192	2,308	885
0067	2,308	736
0309	2,307	1,490
0536	2,307	860
0122	2,298	855
0613	2,296	750
0226	2,296	724
0313	2,295	1,072
0022	2,294	881
0273	2,293	1,360
0636	2,291	785
0725	2,290	827
0591	2,290	571
0065	2,281	838
0179	2,281	825
0148	2,280	1,449
0068	2,276	743
0457	2,272	782
0793	2,271	842
0499	2,270	1,421
0864	2,269	621
0133	2,257	1,390
0237	2,257	757
0130	2,253	1,422
0061	2,249	690
0183	2,240	1,409
0039	2,232	1,208
0231	2,229	739
0324	2,227	1,331
0218	2,224	954
0304	2,222	1,316
0031	2,221	774
0236	2,215	756
0140	2,214	1,095



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0507	2,214	665
0771	2,213	748
0464	2,205	971
0648	2,204	1,050
0569	2,202	1,033
0504	2,201	1,274
0038	2,200	1,175
0275	2,200	929
0210	2,190	974
0690	2,187	868
0376	2,177	644
0321	2,176	520
0497	2,175	857
0505	2,174	996
0868	2,170	697
0698	2,167	824
0456	2,166	784
0554	2,159	722
0315	2,157	1,185
0594	2,155	975
0185	2,151	877
0049	2,148	821
0687	2,146	1,073
0175	2,145	1,345
0034	2,144	1,091
0222	2,141	1,355
0128	2,140	1,303
0154	2,140	763
0216	2,140	761
0249	2,130	792
0195	2,127	812
0255	2,126	1,277
0585	2,125	643
0064	2,124	751
0319	2,115	835
0696	2,115	681
0590	2,113	1,285
0207	2,109	941
0041	2,106	944
0285	2,104	892

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0667	2,103	1,097
0053	2,103	1,057
0033	2,102	1,007
0350	2,100	1,113
0679	2,100	875
0381	2,096	595
0415	2,095	1,169
0756	2,093	679
0011	2,092	580
0471	2,090	726
0083	2,089	616
0483	2,088	1,003
0759	2,087	903
0298	2,083	1,013
0314	2,077	779
0758	2,075	998
0028	2,059	934
0699	2,053	1,001
0126	2,052	970
0593	2,051	730
0704	2,050	879
0238	2,050	689
0117	2,050	639
0445	2,048	1,081
0385	2,046	1,335
0251	2,045	806
0297	2,044	833
0692	2,043	912
0265	2,040	1,177
0732	2,039	998
0268	2,034	1,198
0239	2,034	767
0663	2,032	941
0139	2,029	1,110
0782	2,019	754
0379	2,016	892
0136	2,009	978
0599	2,009	783
0567	2,008	680
0295	2,005	650



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0665	2,004	820
0402	2,002	847
0088	1,996	655
0358	1,993	500
0081	1,990	645
0555	1,988	657
0652	1,987	948
0060	1,985	1,031
0755	1,985	648
0738	1,983	973
0549	1,981	662
0727	1,980	721
0401	1,980	627
0437	1,978	1,181
0118	1,976	1,290
0138	1,974	685
0615	1,967	979
0455	1,967	691
0711	1,966	1,004
0098	1,959	700
0248	1,958	435
0114	1,957	843
0102	1,955	551
0181	1,945	620
0134	1,940	888
0668	1,939	717
0233	1,934	964
0104	1,933	849
0327	1,929	600
0099	1,923	624
0125	1,921	768
0343	1,920	712
0473	1,918	1,108
0044	1,917	552
0360	1,916	1,007
0272	1,911	637
0014	1,909	1,102
0212	1,907	604
0498	1,903	703
0744	1,889	943

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0325	1,886	540
0726	1,884	860
0146	1,879	1,029
0496	1,877	619
0610	1,871	623
0215	1,869	1,107
0008	1,863	920
0342	1,862	452
0282	1,858	989
0378	1,858	727
0269	1,857	1,218
0059	1,851	922
0493	1,838	973
0258	1,835	1,171
0047	1,835	616
0488	1,833	712
0409	1,822	462
0190	1,819	450
0729	1,817	868
0582	1,817	583
0281	1,816	1,102
0001	1,816	741
0458	1,808	834
0794	1,805	399
0571	1,799	375
0511	1,798	890
0878	1,795	693
0071	1,793	626
0176	1,792	1,076
0448	1,790	899
0453	1,790	712
0348	1,788	832
0227	1,784	1,159
0392	1,781	759
0489	1,780	830
0010	1,778	637
0279	1,772	519
0171	1,770	552
0439	1,757	1,048
0153	1,744	538



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0188	1,743	497
0438	1,741	1,089
0689	1,740	651
0370	1,739	774
0861	1,723	573
0306	1,720	979
0792	1,716	546
0395	1,712	982
0293	1,712	946
0719	1,711	530
0257	1,711	460
0115	1,704	515
0339	1,703	623
0561	1,700	545
0063	1,694	650
0822	1,693	555
0164	1,691	606
0072	1,689	683
0051	1,688	695
0625	1,683	921
0296	1,677	902
0773	1,676	571
0467	1,672	491
0100	1,670	525
0403	1,663	1,057
0703	1,660	865
0254	1,660	365
0345	1,646	503
0491	1,645	838
0244	1,642	781
0695	1,641	468
0537	1,639	913
0189	1,636	772
0573	1,634	602
0705	1,627	362
0637	1,626	515
0323	1,625	612
0170	1,622	456
0646	1,621	601
0320	1,620	506

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0322	1,616	520
0026	1,614	637
0383	1,614	144
0178	1,613	955
0085	1,613	631
0316	1,612	957
0550	1,612	522
0214	1,605	932
0247	1,604	567
0043	1,589	584
0289	1,586	595
0107	1,583	492
0874	1,580	786
0205	1,568	618
0628	1,563	554
0432	1,562	394
0003	1,559	871
0277	1,555	527
0280	1,548	522
0723	1,547	623
0202	1,547	520
0583	1,546	540
0145	1,543	542
0441	1,533	878
0310	1,528	844
0391	1,528	721
0730	1,526	911
0632	1,521	818
0597	1,518	589
0328	1,518	436
0579	1,518	385
0752	1,511	708
0317	1,507	707
0232	1,502	880
0735	1,502	778
0570	1,499	610
0757	1,498	360
0242	1,493	451
0449	1,473	456
0487	1,470	397



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0623	1,468	658
0678	1,466	540
0037	1,463	769
0335	1,450	348
0543	1,449	493
0078	1,448	520
0807	1,448	501
0444	1,438	690
0691	1,422	710
0069	1,415	492
0430	1,412	480
0388	1,402	854
0004	1,399	819
0380	1,394	570
0284	1,381	631
0155	1,381	377
0390	1,375	717
0587	1,375	494
0144	1,373	536
0308	1,369	532
0840	1,367	453
0713	1,362	535
0575	1,359	838
0264	1,352	703
0290	1,349	490
0580	1,348	436
0795	1,346	411
0084	1,345	491
0073	1,344	631
0875	1,344	380
0082	1,341	724
0162	1,338	405
0786	1,338	328
0365	1,332	761
0235	1,328	518
0426	1,321	652
0608	1,321	357
0344	1,310	452
0653	1,308	745
0005	1,301	679

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0056	1,298	677
0349	1,296	487
0131	1,293	412
0821	1,292	384
0366	1,292	342
0230	1,290	470
0305	1,286	794
0127	1,280	446
0086	1,278	422
0066	1,273	396
0530	1,267	445
0560	1,266	384
0330	1,263	477
0194	1,253	579
0501	1,252	532
0018	1,244	787
0291	1,234	661
0292	1,233	426
0779	1,233	357
0763	1,225	329
0020	1,224	361
0329	1,221	465
0700	1,220	359
0748	1,218	367
0595	1,214	367
0423	1,211	447
0710	1,209	606
0460	1,209	440
0009	1,204	367
0052	1,202	553
0341	1,199	340
0581	1,197	510
0503	1,195	402
0177	1,192	659
0538	1,189	427
0042	1,174	470
0606	1,174	377
0434	1,171	643
0161	1,164	472
0393	1,159	402



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0447	1,157	412
0245	1,153	542
0007	1,135	443
0361	1,131	436
0032	1,129	551
0767	1,127	369
0784	1,123	399
0470	1,120	387
0584	1,118	354
0075	1,114	451
0246	1,113	596
0135	1,110	786
0025	1,108	371
0556	1,107	311
0475	1,104	332
0054	1,092	592
0250	1,087	383
0540	1,078	626
0123	1,070	538
0367	1,066	323
0532	1,059	516
0193	1,047	389
0372	1,045	457
0621	1,039	242
0070	1,038	623
0263	1,035	315
0299	1,026	265
0228	1,023	572
0589	1,019	325
0533	1,008	306
0408	1,006	264
0016	1,003	386
0728	1,001	405
0442	998	575
0712	994	372
0472	991	531
0427	989	386
0677	986	305
0624	969	353
0394	968	278

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0141	960	259
0715	955	334
0089	950	574
0433	948	344
0091	948	332
0150	940	327
0592	935	297
0827	933	198
0203	931	284
0229	927	286
0048	923	351
0607	923	178
0502	921	307
0184	920	349
0425	904	363
0429	896	404
0058	891	349
0374	886	302
0737	885	303
0151	881	298
0002	879	378
0191	878	229
0531	867	342
0120	863	248
0336	860	341
0186	860	240
0030	852	374
0166	850	329
0397	848	262
0201	846	281
0882	844	245
0160	835	349
0424	831	531
0142	821	275
0661	821	252
0355	815	292
0159	812	226
0740	810	272
0847	810	194
0777	810	177



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0012	809	276
0173	808	298
0731	804	224
0539	800	265
0225	796	254
0368	764	293
0406	750	290
0262	740	360
0382	735	249
0055	734	267
0694	730	391
0801	727	267
0021	723	289
0598	715	263
0389	714	197
0198	712	235
0685	711	299
0261	710	213
0562	709	245
0859	696	294
0326	687	220
0410	681	225
0337	681	199
0405	670	261
0781	658	264
0526	654	228
0168	650	227
0137	640	357
0693	630	304
0780	617	154
0884	617	153
0746	611	233
0019	610	152
0702	602	187
0602	595	274
0630	588	289
0787	584	163
0873	582	212
0708	579	154
0443	574	370

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0877	573	217
0750	570	195
0724	563	307
0172	560	240
0024	546	209
0707	528	236
0788	527	190
0686	523	135
0527	519	113
0094	518	184
0701	512	517
0577	509	225
0023	494	124
0106	488	86
0836	482	129
0121	474	208
0749	474	160
0796	473	172
0783	468	189
0766	468	140
0334	459	97
0706	451	215
0196	450	151
0035	448	102
0574	441	129
0077	438	139
0143	427	132
0412	423	164
0243	417	158
0101	410	128
0187	402	134
0879	398	107
0832	397	85
0839	394	100
0741	392	74
0803	384	171
0421	384	135
0846	373	84
0544	369	141
0371	349	123



Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0818	347	92
0826	345	171
0802	342	148
0714	335	78
0761	315	192
0743	306	42
0811	301	113
0785	282	90
0808	272	95
0629	271	44
0872	270	100
0683	259	75
0753	250	126
0446	245	65
0810	241	61
0819	223	110
0829	214	105
0733	201	45
0369	192	72
0815	189	82
0799	179	39
0373	178	63
0854	172	52
0845	170	41
0400	170	32
0770	166	44
0535	152	36
0528	150	47
0096	148	34
0332	144	28
0546	135	46
0841	132	37
0880	130	34
0809	110	31
0837	109	60
0816	108	27
0831	92	40
0775	85	36
0776	57	6
0843	52	18

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0825	47	15
0797	37	10
0680	34	16
0852	28	7
0865	28	5
0838	27	18
0736	25	6
0167	24	8
0820	22	9
0833	20	12
0835	19	6
0844	19	5
0855	19	5
0717	18	4
0681	13	5
0790	11	2
0283	4	2
0830	3	2
0684	2	4
0346	2	2
0857	2	0
0774	1	5
0834	1	2
0806	1	1
0850	1	1
0812	1	0
0778	0	9
0789	0	8
0676	0	2
0742	0	2
0762	0	2
0860	0	2
0866	0	2
0871	0	2
0754	0	1
0769	0	1
0791	0	1
0798	0	1
0858	0	1
0209	0	0

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0331	0	0
0666	0	0
0675	0	0
0817	0	0
0856	0	0
0862	0	0
0863	0	0
0867	0	0
0869	0	0
0870	0	0
0876	0	0
0883	0	0



Hidalgo County 2002 General Election

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0039	4,028	1,123
0090	3,763	1,093
0097	3,717	1,084
0053	3,592	966
0036	3,591	1,073
0038	3,570	1,315
0007	3,526	1,136
0088	3,367	864
0020	3,354	917
0095	3,327	811
0112	3,281	783
0049	3,169	893
0056	3,161	984
0098	3,134	903
0004	3,130	1,131
0099	3,094	703
0043	3,059	750
0048	3,043	928
0096	2,966	1,382
0115	2,961	781
0050	2,892	1,189
0094	2,880	849
0010	2,858	855
0023	2,847	728
0055	2,830	826
0035	2,821	939
0047	2,676	832
0062	2,656	1,201
0068	2,629	740
0122	2,618	537
0069	2,570	698
0003	2,548	676
0054	2,397	982
0014	2,385	899
0040	2,371	635
0037	2,324	859
0061	2,299	617
0107	2,295	783

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0111	2,283	813
0011	2,245	860
0034	2,240	959
0005	2,233	567
0124	2,214	904
0042	2,197	571
0002	2,183	723
0081	2,172	814
0127	2,158	726
0051	2,139	911
0106	2,134	932
0103	2,115	989
0119	2,037	614
0077	1,883	558
0032	1,864	659
0008	1,829	666
0114	1,815	750
0065	1,799	485
0120	1,773	354
0016	1,762	545
0100	1,736	531
0067	1,717	793
0046	1,714	479
0108	1,693	573
0013	1,672	643
0045	1,672	609
0117	1,666	422
0109	1,650	451
0017	1,639	441
0059	1,634	415
0074	1,631	480
0101	1,612	551
0079	1,601	396
0052	1,563	805
0009	1,559	521
0123	1,532	566
0078	1,494	456
0113	1,490	543

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0091	1,478	311
0073	1,470	619
0027	1,444	418
0028	1,437	456
0025	1,416	432
0063	1,413	408
0060	1,402	275
0026	1,345	408
0031	1,330	262
0022	1,300	336
0071	1,299	427
0064	1,299	320
0070	1,274	278
0072	1,252	471
0058	1,241	319
0126	1,202	575
0083	1,188	517
0029	1,145	508
0041	1,096	216
0105	987	304
0057	981	220
0033	979	379
0006	974	346
0085	963	245
0116	931	259
0128	923	176
0125	855	366
0030	775	215
0075	734	226
0084	714	341
0066	661	185
0102	658	260
0087	615	484
0092	612	157
0044	564	168
0110	549	119
0015	526	111
0130	521	153
0018	497	131
0104	463	125

Precinct	Registered Voters	Turnout
0001	296	102
0129	245	96
0012	198	93
0121	182	60
0019	141	70
0089	133	50
0118	119	43
0024	108	65
0076	29	24
0021	22	8

APPENDIX B

Voting Scripts

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	4:42	Script # 81
	El Paso	Diebold	96	Time Ballot Cast:	4:47	
Tester:	NICK		Video:	Cliff Coats		
Observer	UZ		Machine: B			
PART 2	Language: English					
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester authorizes a new ballot with the Card Programmer, inserts it into the DRE to activate a ballot.						
3. The Tester selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an Unscripted Error in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						

El Paso County

Precinct Number: 96

Summary of Ballot Number: 81

Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	Democratic Party (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
United States Senator	Barbara Ann Radnotsky (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
United States Representative District 16	Silvestre Reyes (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Governor	Chris Bell (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Lieutenant Governor	Maria Luisa Alvarado (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Attorney General	David Van Os (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Fred Head (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Valinda Hathcox (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Commissioner of Agriculture	Hank Gilbert (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Railroad Commissioner	Date Henry (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Tom Oxford (LIB)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	William E. "Bill" Moody (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	Jerry Adkins (LIB)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Todd Phlippippi (LIB)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Phil Johnson (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	J.R. Molina (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Quanah Parker (LIB)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Charles Holcomb (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Member, State Board of Education, District 1	Rene Nunez (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
State Senator, District 29	Eliot Shapleigh (DEM)	✓	✓	U		✓	put back button to candidate page, no change made
State Representative, District 75	Chente Quintanilla (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Ann Crawford McClure (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	David Wellington Chew (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Judge, 120th Judicial District	Maria Salas-Mendoza (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Judge, 168th Judicial District	Guadalupe Rivera (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	

El Paso County
Precinct 96

Test Ballot # 81

Page 2 of 3



Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re- Voted	Re- Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 171st Judicial District	Bonnie Rangel (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 205th Judicial District	Kathleen H. Olivares (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 210th Judicial District	Gonzalo Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 273rd Judicial District	David C. Guadarrama (DEM)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 327th Judicial District	Linda Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Judge	Antonio "Anthony" Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	Ricardo Herrera (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Julie Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	Javier Alvarez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	Alex Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 5	Carlos Villa (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 6	M. Sue Kurita (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 7	Tom Spieczny (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 1	Alma R. Tejo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 2	Robert S. Archondo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	Yvonne Rodriguez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Eduardo Gamboa (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Clerk	Gilbert Jesus Sanchez (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Clerk	Della Flores (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Commissioner, Precinct No. 1 (Current Term)	Luis C. Sarrana (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 4	Rosalba Munoz, Jr. (DEM)	✓	✓				
[Review Screen]							

APPENDIX C

Activity Checklists

Texas Secretary of State November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot El Paso County Activity Checklist

As an activity is completed, the team lead will initial in the “complete” column. Note that some of the activities must be performed for both DRE units. This checklist will be turned in at the end of the testing along with other testing documentation.

A. Prior to Monday November 6, 2002		Complete
A1	Team lead picks up testing materials from the project manager at HBMG, including test scripts, forms, team member badges, and equipment. PM advises the team lead of the precinct to select.	N.O.
B. Monday November 6, 2002		Complete
B1	Team members travel to El Paso County, pick up vehicle.	N.O.
B2	Team checks into La Quinta before continuing on to testing site	N.O.
B3	The team lead and the team members will meet with county representatives to review the testing room, ensure that participants understand all county procedures and protocols, confirm arrival time Tuesday morning, and identify any county personnel who may be working with the team.	N.O.
B4	The team lead will advise the election systems administrator of the precinct that was chosen for the test. The administrator will create two replacement DREs to exchange for the DREs the team will take from the precinct to test.	→ DISCREPANCY REPORT #2
B5	The administrator and the team will drive to the selected precinct, and swap the new DREs for two in the precinct selected at random. The team will return to the elections warehouse where the DREs will be secured until Tuesday morning when testing begins.	N.O.
B6	The Team Lead will complete the Voting System Component Selection form including any additional equipment that is needed for a fully functional precinct system.	(28) GAD
B7	Team meets afterwards to discuss questions arising from warehouse visit.	✓
B8	The Team Lead will receive calls from the other team leads by 9:00 pm CST to confirming that all personnel have arrived, and have been informed of the time and place to meet Tuesday morning to travel to the testing location. Note the time of the status calls. Hidalgo <u>4:33 9:33 MST</u> Harris <u>8:04 MST</u>	No
C. Tuesday November 8, 2006		Complete
C1	Team members meet at the assigned time and location to travel to the testing location.	✓
C2	Team Rules: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team Lead will distribute member badges and ensure they are affixed appropriately on clothing. Badges must be worn and visible the entire day. • All cell phones are turned off except for the team lead who must be available at all times during the day. • The original testing documentation will 	N.A.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Not be out of sight of the team lead ✓ ➤ Be returned to the team lead and secured according to program procedures. • The electronic voting equipment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Not be out of sight of the team lead ➤ Be returned to the team lead and secured according to program procedures. • The video will be running continuously from the securing of the equipment to its being locked down after the test is complete. ✓ 	
C3	The test team travels to the testing location. The location for El Paso county is the county elections warehouse.	NO
C4	<p>The Team Lead will meet county representatives at the warehouse to determine if</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A county representative will be present when the zero totals tapes are generated 2. A county representative will be present when the final tally tapes are generated. <p><i>Note: Requests by county representatives for copies of any testing materials or documentation will be made to Katie Morrissey of the SOS office.</i> ✓</p>	NO YES
C5	<p>The video operator captures the team being escorted to the equipment storage location and the subsequent move or monitoring of the movement of the test equipment to the testing room.</p> <p><i>Note: No public observers are allowed during this testing session.</i> ✓</p> <p>AND ✓</p> <p><i>The camera used to capture the equipment being moved becomes the "panorama" camera.</i> ✓</p>	N.O
C6	The video camera operator sets up the video equipment, verifying that the video clock is accurate. Video operator labels tapes with the SOS Parallel Monitoring Labels.	NO
C7	The video operator videotapes all the equipment seals to ensure that all seals are intact.	NO
C8	The team lead ensures all the electronic and paperwork components for the precinct test are present.	NO
C9	The team lead completes the Equipment Security and Chain of Custody form Section 1 – Pre-Test Equipment Security Verification.	NO
C10	The team sets up the equipment according to the county's pollworker guide and/or the vendor's equipment manuals. Clean off residual security tape glue with alcohol swabs.	NO
C11	<p>Team organizes room for testing activities. Video operator sets up one camera to capture unobstructed views of DRE screens at all times. The second camera will be set up to capture an unobstructed view of all testing activities. The testing clock will be set up so it is visible to the second camera at all times.</p> <p>Record time video recording of DRE screens began: <u>7:19</u></p>	N.O
C12	<p>Power on the DRE equipment, and record the terminal serial number, software version, Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the first DRE:</p> <p>Terminal SN: <u>145251</u></p> <p>Software Version: _____</p>	



EASTWOOD HEIGHTS ELEMENTARY

	Public counter <u>380</u> Protective Counter <u>0</u> Record the terminal serial number, software version, Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the second DRE: Terminal SN: <u>145 196</u> Software Version: _____ Public counter <u>0</u> Protective Counter <u>417</u>	
C13	If the county representatives wish to be present for generation of the zero tape, let them know you are preparing to execute this task.	NO
C14	Generate the zero total tape according to instructions in the county's pollworker manual or the vendor's operation manual. If the county representatives want a copy of the tape, generate a second tape for them.	NO
C15	Place the zero total tape in the designated folder in the testing artifacts pouch.	
Open the polls. Testing begins at 7:00 a.m.		Compl
D1	Begin testing promptly at 7:00 a.m. Do not start early even if the team is ready. 7:19 MST Make sure the video camera is recording even if the testing has not begun	NO
D2	Receive calls from other Team Leads at 8:00 CST reporting Opening of the Polls and the team lead contact number. Note the time of the status calls. Hidalgo <u>9:34 MST</u> Harris <u>8:03 MST</u>	N.E
D3	If the testing does not begin at 7:00 a.m., note the reason the team is late and complete a Discrepancy Report.	N.O
D5	Conduct testing as indicated by the Test Script Schedule. Complete discrepancy reports for any deviation from the test scripts that causes interruption of the testing process or that may affect the accuracy of the results.	N.O
D6	Log any calls from other team leads that report any issues that halts testing or impact testing results.	
D10	Execute Test Scripts 7:00 – 9:00	} ad hoc
D11	Break 9:00 – 9:30	
D12	Execute Test Scripts 9:30 – 11:00	
D13	Lunch Break 11:00 – 11:30	
D15	Execute Test Scripts 11:30 – 1:30	
D16	Break 1:30 – 2:00	
D17	Receive and note the time of scheduled status calls from to the Team Leads at 1:30 P.M. CST . Hidalgo <u>2:45 MST</u> Harris <u>12:32 12:50 1:50 MST</u>	N.O
D20	Execute Test Scripts 2:00 – 4:30	



D21	Dinner break 4:30 – 5:00	
D22	Execute Test Scripts 5:00 – 7:00	
Close the polls. Testing ends at 7:00 p.m.		Completed
E1	Execute test scripts until 7:00 p.m. Do not close polls before 7:00 even if all tests have been completed. If testing has not been completed, finish the script you are working on, then stop. Complete a discrepancy report indicating which script numbers you were unable to complete.	7:01 N.O.
E2	Close the polls according to the instructions in the county's pollworker manual or in the vendor's instruction manual.	N.O.
E3	Record the Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the first DRE: Public counter <u>50</u> Protective Counter <u>467</u> Record the Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the second DRE: Public counter <u>50</u> Protective Counter <u>430</u>	N.O.
E4	If the county representatives have indicated that they want to be present for the generation of the tally tapes, let them know you are preparing to execute this task	N.O.
E5	Generate the tally tapes according to the county's pollworker manual or the vendor's instruction manual. If the county representatives want a tally tape, generate another one for them and mark the tape with the DRE unit serial number, your initials, and "Second Tally Tape".	N.O.
E6	Place the tally tape in the designated folder in the testing artifacts pouch.	N.O.
E8	The team lead completes the <i>Equipment Security and Chain of Custody – Section 2, Post-Test Equipment Security Documentation</i> . Both the county representative and the Team lead must sign this section <i>SEE COUNTY FORM WITH SEAL #5</i>	
E9	Put <u>SOS seals</u> on all closed systems. Place the zip lock bag with the remaining swabs on the DRE units so county personnel have the swabs when they remove the seals after the testing equipment is released to inventory.	N.O.
E10	Move, or monitor the moving of the testing equipment back to the secure storage area.	N.O.
E11	The team lead completes the <i>Test Artifact Inventory Checklist</i> to ensure all artifacts are inventoried, secured, and returned to HBMG for evaluation. The team lead gives the county representative a copy of the checklist before leaving the testing facility. — <u>11/08/06</u>	N.O.
E12	The Team lead receives calls from the other team leads reporting that the testing activities are complete and the teams is leaving their testing facilities. Note the time of the calls Hidalgo <u>6:44 MST</u> Harris <u>7:4 6:39 MST</u>	N.O.

E13	The Team lead confirms the team debrief meeting time for the morning of November 8, 2005.	N.O.
F. Wednesday, November 8, 2006		Completed
F1	Team members hold a debrief meeting to go over the debrief checklist and any other issues and observations the team members wish to bring up about the test.	N.O.
F2	The team members travel back to their home sites.	N.O.
G. Thursday November 9, 2006		Completed
G1	The team leads turn over testing artifacts to the Project Manager and participate in a debriefing meeting.	N.O.

Team Lead Nick Osborn


 Signature

**Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot
Harris County Activity Checklist**

As an activity is completed, the team lead will initial in the "complete" column. Note that some of the activities must be performed for both DRE units. This checklist will be turned in at the end of the testing along with other testing documentation.

A. Prior to Monday November 6, 2002		Complete
A1	Terri picks up testing materials from the project manager at HBMG, including test scripts, forms, team member badges, and equipment.	✓
B. Monday November 6, 2002		Complete-
B1	Team members meet between 8-9:00AM, Monday, November 6th, 2006 -- at HBMG Inc., in Austin to drive to Harris County.	<i>in offices of HBMG</i>
B2	Team checks into Hotel in Houston	<i>2nd</i>
B3	Team meets with county representatives to review the testing room, ensure that participants understand all county procedures and protocols, confirm arrival time Tuesday morning, and identify any county personnel who may be working with the team.	<i>1st</i>
B7	Team meets afterwards to discuss questions arising from warehouse visit.	<i>@dunnei</i>
B8	Terri will call the project manager by 9:00 pm CST to confirm that all personnel have arrived, and have been informed of the time and place to meet Tuesday morning to travel to the testing location.	<i>done</i>
C. Tuesday November 8, 2006		Complete
C1	Team members meet at the assigned time and location to travel to the testing location.	✓
C2	Team Rules: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terri will distribute member badges and ensure they are affixed appropriately on clothing. Badges must be worn and visible the entire day. ✓ • All cell phones are turned off except for the team lead who must be available at all times during the day. ✓ • The original testing documentation will ✓ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Not be out of sight of the team lead ➤ Be returned to the team lead and secured according to program procedures. • The electronic voting equipment ✓ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Not be out of sight of the team lead ➤ Be returned to the team lead and secured according to program procedures. • The video will be running continuously from the securing of the equipment to its being locked down after the test is complete. ✓ 	
C3	The test team travels to the testing location.	<i>one car</i>



C4	<p>Terri will meet county representatives at the warehouse and request the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A county representative be present when the zero totals tapes are generated 2. A county representative be present when the final tally tapes are generated. <p><i>Note: Requests by county representatives for copies of any testing materials or documentation will be made to Katie Morrisey of the SOS office.</i></p>	
C5	<p>The video operator captures the team being escorted to the equipment storage location and the subsequent move or monitoring of the movement of the test equipment to the testing room.</p> <p><i>Note: No public observers are allowed during this testing session.</i></p> <p>AND</p> <p><i>The camera used to capture the equipment being moved becomes the "panorama" camera.</i></p>	✓
C6	<p>The video camera operator sets up the video equipment, verifying that the video clock is accurate. Video operator labels tapes with the SOS Parallel Monitoring Labels.</p>	✓
C7	<p>The video operator videotapes all the equipment seals to ensure that all seals are intact.</p>	✓
C8	<p>The team lead ensures all the electronic and paperwork components for the precinct test are present.</p>	✓
C9	<p>The team lead completes the Equipment Security and Chain of Custody form Section 1 – Pre-Test Equipment Security Verification.</p>	✓
C10	<p>The team sets up the equipment according to the county's pollworker guide and/or the vendor's equipment manuals.</p> <p><i>Note: Clean off residual security tape glue with alcohol swabs.</i></p>	✓
C11	<p>Team organizes room for testing activities. Video operator sets up one camera to capture unobstructed views of DRE screens at all times. The second camera will be set up to capture an unobstructed view of all testing activities. The testing clock will be set up so it is visible to the second camera at all times.</p> <p>Record time video recording of DRE screens began: _____</p>	<p>See video logs</p>


C12	<p>Power on the DRE equipment, and record the terminal serial number, The Judge's Booth Controller (JBC) serial number, software version, Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the first eSlate:</p> <p>Terminal SN: _____ JBC SN: _____</p> <p>Software Version: _____</p> <p>Public counter _____ Protective Counter _____</p> <p>Record the terminal serial number, software version, Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the second eSlate:</p> <p>Terminal SN: _____</p> <p>Software Version: _____</p> <p>Public counter _____ Protective Counter _____</p>	
C13	Request that the county representative be present for generation of the zero tape. Let them know you are preparing to execute this task.	
C14	Generate the zero total tape according to instructions in the county's poll worker manual or the vendor's operation manual. If the county representatives want a copy of the tape, generate a second tape for them.	✓
C15	Place the zero total tape in the designated folder in the testing artifacts pouch.	✓
Open the polls. Testing begins at 7:00 a.m.		Completed
D1	Begin testing promptly at 7:00 a.m. Do not start early even if the team is ready.	✓
	Make sure the video camera is recording even if the testing has not begun	✓
D2	Call the Project Manager at 8:00 to provide a status report on Opening the Polls and to confirm the team lead contact number.	✓
	If the testing does not begin at 7:00 a.m., note the reason the team is late and complete a Discrepancy Report.	
D5	Conduct testing as indicated by the Test Script Schedule. Complete discrepancy reports for any deviation from the test scripts, the test script schedule, or equipment malfunction.	✓
D6	Call the Project Manager if an issue arises that halts testing or impacts testing results. Refer to the Discrepancy Reporting Instructions.	poll watcher @ 8:15 AM
D10	Execute Test Scripts 7:00 – 9:00	
D11	Break 9:00 – 9:30	No 30 min Breaks please !!
D12	Execute Test Scripts 9:30 – 11:00	
D13	Lunch Break 11:00 – 11:30	
D15	Execute Test Scripts 11:30 – 1:30	
D16	Break 1:30 – 2:00	
D17	Call the Project Manager at 1:30 CST to provide a status report.	1:30 PM



D20	Execute Test Scripts 2:00 – 4:30	
D21	Dinner break 4:30 – 5:00	
D22	Execute Test Scripts 5:00 – 7:00	
E.	Close the polls. Testing ends at 7:00 p.m.	Completed
E1	Execute test scripts until 7:00 p.m. Do not close polls before 7:00 even if all tests have been completed. If testing has not been completed, finish the script you are working on, then stop. Complete a discrepancy report indicating which script numbers you were unable to complete.	✓
E2	Close the polls according to the instructions in the county's pollworker manual or in the vendor's instruction manual.	✓
E3	Record the Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the first DRE: Public counter _____ Protective Counter _____ Record the Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the second DRE: Public counter _____ Protective Counter _____	see logs
E4	If the county representatives have indicated that they want to be present for the generation of the tally tapes, let them know you are preparing to execute this task	
E5	Generate the tally tapes according to the county's pollworker manual or the vendor's instruction manual. If the county representatives want a tally tape, generate another one for them and mark the tape with the DRE unit serial number, your initials, and "Second Tally Tape".	✓
E6	Place the tally tape in the designated folder in the testing artifacts pouch.	✓
E7	Remove and secure the MBB and memory cards in the equipment money bag . Note the serial numbers of the seals on the <i>Test Artifact Inventory Checklist</i> .	NA
E8	The team lead completes the <i>Equipment Security and Chain of Custody – Section 2, Post-Test Equipment Security Documentation</i> . Both the county representative and the Team lead must sign this section	
E9	Put SOS seals on all closed systems. Place the zip lock bag with the remaining swabs on the DRE units so county personnel have the swabs when they remove the seals after the testing equipment is released to inventory	✓
E10	Move, or monitor the moving of the testing equipment back to the secure storage area.	
E11	The team lead completes the <i>Test Artifact Inventory Checklist</i> to ensure all artifacts are inventoried, secured, and returned to HBMG for evaluation. The team lead gives the county representative a copy of the checklist before leaving the testing facility.	✓
E12	The Team lead calls the Project Manager to report that the testing activities are complete and the team is leaving the testing facility at about 8:00-8:30pm.	✓
E13	The Team lead confirms the team debriefing meeting time for the morning of	@tonch

	November 8, 2005.	
F.	Wednesday, November 8, 2006	Completed
F1	Team members hold a debrief meeting to go over the debrief checklist and any other issues and observations the team members wish to bring up about the test.	@/over in the
F2	The team members travel back to their home sites.	
	Thursday November 9, 2006	Completed
G1	The team leads turn over testing artifacts to the Project Manager and participate in a debriefing meeting.	✓

Team Lead: Terri L. Hagen-Georgulas



 Signature



**Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot
Hidalgo County Activity Checklist**

As an activity is completed, the team lead will initial in the “complete” column. Note that some of the activities must be performed for both DRE units. This checklist will be turned in at the end of the testing along with other testing documentation.

Prior to Monday November 6, 2002		Complete
1	Team lead picks up testing materials from the project manager at HBMG, including test scripts, forms, team member badges, and equipment. PM advises the team lead of the precinct to select.	atj
Monday November 6, 2002		Complete
2	Team members travel to Hidalgo County, pick up vehicle.	atj
3	Art and the team members and Andy Pennington meet with county representatives to review the testing room, ensure that participants understand all county procedures and protocols, confirm arrival time Tuesday morning, and identify any county personnel who may be working with the team.	atj
4	Art lead will advise Mike of the precinct that was chosen for the test. Mike will create all the PEBs, memory cards, and other peripheral equipment that will be needed for the test in a precinct. Mike will lock the devices in a money bag in the same way precinct equipment is handled.	atj prec39
5	Mike, Art, Andy, and any of the team Art includes, will drive to the selected precinct, and swap the new bag for the current bag in the precinct cage. Art will keep the bag secure until Tuesday morning when testing begins.	atj
6	Art will complete the Voting System Component Selection form, adding the items contained in the Money bag.	atj
7	Art will call the project manager by 9:00 pm CST to confirm that all personnel have arrived, and have been informed of the time and place to meet Tuesday morning to travel to the testing location.	atj
Tuesday November 8, 2006		Complete
8	Team members meet at the assigned time and location to travel to the testing location.	atj
9	Art will distribute member badges and ensure they are affixed appropriately on clothing. All cell phones are turned off except for the team lead who must be available at all times during the day.	atj
10	The test team travels to the testing location. The location for Hidalgo county is the county elections office warehouse.	atj
11	Art will meets county representatives at the warehouse and documents the following: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The testing team will display the official Inspector badges at all times 2. Confirm that copies of the testing tapes will be delivered to the designated Hidalgo County Clerk official as soon HBMG can process them after November 14, 2006 3. Enquire whether the county representative wants to be present when the 	atj



	<p>zero totals tapes are generated</p> <p>4. Enquire whether the county representative wants to be present when the final tally tapes are generated.</p> <p>If the county representative requests copies of any testing documentation, the team lead will accompany the county representative to the copying location and maintain visual contact with all testing materials. The original testing documentation will be returned to the team lead and secured according to program procedures.</p>	atj
12	The team is escorted to the equipment storage location and moves or monitors the movement of the test equipment to the testing room. Note that no public observers are allowed during this testing session.	atj
13	The video camera operator sets up the video equipment, verifying that the video clock is accurate. Video operator labels tapes with the SOS Parallel Monitoring Labels.	atj
14	The video operator videotapes all the equipment seals to ensure that all seals are intact. Seal # 600 67900	atj
15	The team lead unlocks the money bag and inventories the contents to ensure all the components for the precinct are present.	atj
16	The team lead completes the Equipment Security and Chain of Custody form Section 1 – Pre-Test Equipment Security Verification.	atj
17	The team sets up the equipment according to the county's pollworker guide and/or the vendors equipment manuals. Clean off residual security tape glue with alcohol swabs.	atj
18	<p>Team organizes room for testing activities. Video operator sets up cameras to capture unobstructed view of DRE screens at all times.</p> <p>Record time video recording of DRE screens began: _____</p>	atj
19	<p>Power on the DRE equipment.</p> <p>Record the terminal serial number, PEB serial number, software version, Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the first DRE:</p> <p>Terminal SN: <u>5132620</u> PEB SN: <u>PS0161694</u> <u>PS0176164</u></p> <p>Software Version: _____</p> <p>Public counter _____ Protective Counter _____</p> <p>Record the terminal serial number, software version, Public and Protective vote counts displayed on the first DRE:</p> <p>Terminal SN: <u>5112990</u> PEB SN: <u>PS0161694</u></p> <p>Software Version: _____</p> <p>Public counter _____ Protective Counter _____</p>	



20	If the county representatives wish to be present for generation of the zero tape, let them know you are preparing to execute this task.	
21	Generate the zero total tape according to instructions in the county's pollworker manual or the vendor's operation manual. If the county representatives want a copy of the tape, generate a second tape for them.	
22	Place the zero total tape in the designated folder in the testing artifacts pouch.	
Open the polls. Testing begins at 7:00 a.m.		Completed
23	Begin testing promptly at 7:00 a.m. Do not start early even if the team is ready. Make sure the video camera is recording even if the testing has not begun	ah
24	Call the Project Manager to report Opening of the Polls and to confirm the team lead contact number. If the testing does not begin at 7:00 a.m., note the reason the team is late and complete a Discrepancy Report.	ah
25	Conduct testing as indicated by the Test Script Schedule. Complete discrepancy reports for any deviation from the test scripts, the test script schedule, or equipment malfunction.	ah
26	Call the Project Manager if an issue arises that halts testing or impacts testing results. Refer to the Discrepancy Reporting Instructions.	ah
27	Conduct a scheduled status call to the Project Manager at 9:30 a.m.	ah
28	Conduct a scheduled status call to the Project Manager at 1:30 a.m.	ah
29	Conduct a scheduled status call to the Project Manager at 5:35 a.m.	ah
Close the polls. Testing ends at 7:00 p.m.		Completed
30	Execute test scripts until 7:00 p.m. Do not close polls before 7:00 even if all tests have been completed. If testing has not been completed, finish the script you are working on, then stop. Complete a discrepancy report indicating which script numbers you were unable to complete.	
		Completed
31	If the county representatives have indicated that they want to be present for the generation of the tally tapes, let them know you are preparing to execute this task	
32	Generate the tally tapes according to the county's pollworker manual or the vendor's instruction manual. If the county representatives want a tally tape, generate another one for them and mark the tape with the DRE unit serial number, your initials, and "Second Tally Tape".	
33	Place the tally tape in the designated folder in the testing artifacts pouch.	
34	Remove and secure the MBB and memory cards in the equipment money bag. Note the serial numbers of the seals on the <i>Test Artifact Inventory Checklist</i> .	
35	The team lead completes the <i>Equipment Security and Chain of Custody – Section 2, Post-Test Equipment Security Documentation</i> . Both the county representative and the Team lead must sign this section	
36	Place the zip lock bag with the remaining swabs on the DRE units so county	

	personnel have the swabs when they remove the seals after the testing equipment is released to inventory.	
37	Move, or monitor the moving of the testing equipment back to the secure storage area.	
38	The team lead completes the <i>Test Artifact Inventory Checklist</i> to ensure all artifacts are inventoried, secured, and returned to HBMG for evaluation. The team lead gives the county representative a copy of the checklist before leaving the testing facility.	
39	The Team lead calls the Project Manager to report that the testing activities are complete and the team is leaving the testing facility.	
40	The Team lead confirms the team debrief meeting time for the morning of November 8, 2005.	
Wednesday, November 8, 2006		Completed
41	Team members hold a debrief meeting to go over the debrief checklist and any other issues and observations the team members wish to bring up about the test.	
42	The team members travel back to their home sites.	
Thursday November 9, 2006		Completed
43	The team leads turn over testing artifacts to the Project Manager and participate in a debriefing meeting.	
<p>Team Lead Arturo Garcia _____ Signature</p>		



APPENDIX D

Videotape Logs

HARRIS COUNTY -- SECRETARY OF STATE VIDEO LOG

A CAMERA <i>panoramic</i>				B CAMERA <i>close up</i>				Notes:
Usually the 'close-up camera'				Usually the 'panoramic camera'				
Tape #	APPROXIMATE TAPE STARTED / ENDED	NUMBER LAST SCRIPT COMPLETED	INITIALS LOGGED BY:	APPROXIMATE TAPE STARTED / ENDED	NUMBER LAST SCRIPT COMPLETED	INITIALS LOGGED BY:		
1	6:20 / 7:15	1	BDC	6:25 / 7:15	1	BDC	obtaining voting equipment w/ Cam A, set up w/ both, Estate A	
2	7:15 / 8:15	6	BDC	7:15 / 8:15	6	BDC	Estate "A"	
3	8:15 / 9:10	11	BDC	8:15 / 9:10	11	BDC	script 7 on "A", switch to Estate "B"	
4	9:10 / 10:05	16	BDC	9:10 / 10:05	16	BDC	Estate "B"	
5	10:05 / 11:00	25	BDC	10:05 / 11:00	25	BDC	Estate "A"	
6	11:00 / 12:00	32	BDC	11:00 / 12:00	32	BDC	Estate "B"	
7	12:00 / 12:55	40	BDC	12:00 / 12:55	40	BDC	Estate "A"	
8	12:55 / 1:50	47	BDC	12:55 / 1:50	47	BDC	Estate "B"	
9	1:50 / 2:45	52	BDC	1:50 / 2:45	52	BDC	small break, both inside & start Estate "A"	
10	2:45 / 3:40	59	BDC	2:45 / 3:40	59	BDC	Estate "B"	
11	3:40 / 4:30	66	BDC	3:40 / 4:30	66	BDC	False start on camera A, battery low, changed, stopped tape, rewound, started again - B continued to roll	
12	4:30 / 5:25	73	BDC	4:30 / 5:25	73	BDC	Estate "B"	
13	5:25 / 6:20	82	BDC	5:25 / 6:20	82	BDC	Estate "A"	
14	6:20 / 6:55	88	BDC	6:20 / 6:55	88	BDC	Estate "B"	
15	6:55 / 7:40	NA	BDC	6:55 / 7:40	NA	BDC	closing polls	
	/			/				
	/			/				
	/			/				
	/			/				
	/			/				



EL PASO COUNTY -- SECRETARY OF STATE VIDEO LOG

A CAMERA <i>Usually the 'close up camera'</i>				B CAMERA <i>Usually the 'panoramic camera'</i>				Notes:
Tape #	APPROXIMATE TIME TAPE STARTED / ENDED	NUMBER LAST SCRIPT COMPLETED	APPROXIMATE TIME TAPE STARTED / ENDED	NUMBER LAST SCRIPT COMPLETED	Initials Logged by:			
1	7:19 / 8:05	5	7:00 / 7:45	2	CNC			
2	8:06 / 8:54	12	7:45 / 8:28	8	CNC			
3	8:56 / 9:45	21	8:28 / 9:16	16	CNC			
4	9:46 / 10:39	30	9:16 / 10:11	26	CNC			
5	10:40 / 11:33	37	10:11 / 11:00	32	CNC			
6	11:34 / 12:30	43	11:00 / 11:48	40	CNC			
7	12:31 / 1:25	53	11:48 / 12:46	47	CNC			
8	1:25 / 2:24	66	12:46 / 1:27	53	CNC			
9	2:25 / 3:22	71	1:27 / 2:25	66	CNC			
10	3:22 / 4:20	78	2:25 / 3:24	71	CNC			
11	4:40 / 5:06	81	3:25 / 4:20	78	CNC	Camera A switched to standby; lost 20 min.		
12	5:06 / 6:00	91	4:22 / 5:05	81	CNC			
13	6:00 / 7:00	101	5:05 / 6:00	91	CNC			
14	/		6:00 / 6:58	100	CNC	last vote and wrap up on B14		
15	/		/					
	/		/					
	/		/					
	/		/					
	/		/					
	/		/					

HIDALGO COUNTY -- SECRETARY OF STATE VIDEO LOG

Tape #	A CAMERA <i>Usually the 'close up camera'</i>			B CAMERA <i>Usually the 'panoramic camera'</i>			Notes:	Voting Machine
	APPROXIMATE TAPE STARTED / ENDED	NUMBER SCRIPT COMPLETED	INITIALS LOGGED BY:	APPROXIMATE TAPE STARTED / ENDED	NUMBER SCRIPT COMPLETED	INITIALS LOGGED BY:		
1	7:05 / 7:45	5	AAS	6:45 / 7:40	5	AAS	Reset camera A after 1st script Font is small and backlit - difficult to film	A
2	7:45 / 8:40	11	AAS	7:40 / 8:35	11	AAS	Reset Camera A again for better view	A
3	8:40 / 9:25	21	AAS	8:35 / 9:20	21	AAS	Removed left panel from Voting Machine A	A
4	9:25 / 10:30	26	AAS	9:20 / 10:25	26	AAS	Breakfast Break at beginning	A
5	10:30 / 11:00	30	AAS	10:25 / 10:55	30	AAS	Changing to Voting Machine B	A
6	11:00 / 11:52	37	AAS	10:55 / 11:48	37	AAS	Began lunch breaks / Reset camera A to get more of the screen	B
7	11:52 / 12:50	45	AAS	11:48 / 12:45	45	AAS	Reset Camera B tripod during switch	B
8	12:50 / 1:43	53	AAS	12:45 / 1:38	53	AAS	Election workers came through (3)	B
9	1:43 / 2:40	60	AAS	1:38 / 2:35	60	AAS	Camera B ran out of Battery 52 min in	B
10	2:40 / 3:35	65	AAS	2:35 / 3:30	63	AAS	Break at beginning / Back to Voting Machine A	A
11	3:35 / 4:35	71	AAS	3:30 / 4:30	71	AAS	Audio on Camera A Left channel only	A
12	4:35 / 5:30	74	AAS	4:30 / 5:25	74	AAS	Break at beginning	A
13	5:30 / 6:30	82	AAS	5:25 / 6:25	82	AAS	Moved to Voting Machine B	B
14	6:30 / 7:25	87	AAS	6:25 / 7:20	87	AAS	Moved to Voting Machine A	A
15	/			/			↳ Includes Breakdown	
16	/			/				
17	/			/				
18	/			/				
19	/			/				



Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot
Discrepancy Log

County: El Paso DRE serial number N/A
 Team lead: Nick Osborn Team member: Liz Fisher
 Videographer: Cliff Coats Team member: Kevin Barton

Report No	Brief Description of Issue/Resolution	Test Number	Tester/Observer	Time of Discrepancy	Team Lead Signature
1	START LATE	N/A	N/A	7:19	Nick Osborn
2	DREs NOT AVAILABLE 11/6	N/A	N/A	11/6 4:30 P.M.	Nick Osborn
3	MONITOR CAMERA UNPLUGGED	79, 80	NICK LIZ	4:33 - 4:40	Nick Osborn
4	SCRIPT ERROR FOR CHIEF JUSTICE	94	NICK LIZ	6:15	Nick Osborn
5					
6					
7					
8					

**Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot
Discrepancy Log**

County: Hidalgo DRE serial number _____
 Team lead: Art Garcia Team member: Sam Brandon
 Videographer: Aaron Sanders Team member: Ernesto Ballesteros

Report No	Brief Description of Issue/Resolution	Test Number	Tester/Observer	Time of Discrepancy	Team Lead Signature
1	Camera-10 ran out of battery	45	REUNINGTON BRANDON	1:38	<i>[Signature]</i>
2	No Zero Tape taken at beginning of testing	N/A	ART GARCIA	N/A	<i>[Signature]</i>
3a	due to no printer available				
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					



APPENDIX F

Discrepancy Reports

Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot

El Paso County Discrepancy Report No. 1

DRE Serial Number N/A Time 7:19

1. Provide a detailed description of the issue (e.g. had to restart the test process because of significant error, equipment malfunction).

TRAFFIC PROBLEMS PREVENTED US FROM
PICKING UP DRES FROM THE PRECINCT ON TIME

2. If applicable, record the test script number the team was executing: N/A

3. Has this issue delayed or halted testing or will it impact expected results? Yes No
If yes, call your SOS contact, indicate the time of the call and document the discussion and resolution below:

DELAYED

4. Does this issue require further action by the SOS Office? Yes No
If yes, describe the action required.

5. Ask the County Team Leader to review and, if the Team Leader approves the documentation above, sign off on this Report. Once the report has been signed, the Team Leader will record the appropriate information in the Discrepancy Log.

6. Report Completed by: NICK OSBORN

7. Report Reviewed and Approved by County Team Leader:

Nick Osborn



Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot

El Paso County Discrepancy Report No. 2

DRE Serial Number N/A Time 4:30 11/06

1. Provide a detailed description of the issue (e.g. had to restart the test process because of significant error, equipment malfunction).

MACHINES WERE NOT AVAILABLE 11/06 BECAUSE SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED FOR THE DAY

2. If applicable, record the test script number the team was executing: N/A

3. Has this issue delayed or halted testing or will it impact expected results? Yes No
If yes, call your SOS contact, indicate the time of the call and document the discussion and resolution below:

DELAYED OPENING POLLS BECAUSE WE HAD TO PICK UP DRES FROM THE SCHOOL AT 6:30 AM.

4. Does this issue require further action by the SOS Office? Yes No
If yes, describe the action required.

5. Ask the County Team Leader to review and, if the Team Leader approves the documentation above, sign off on this Report. Once the report has been signed, the Team Leader will record the appropriate information in the Discrepancy Log.

6. Report Completed by: Nick OSBORN

7. Report Reviewed and Approved by County Team Leader:

Nick Osborn

Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot

El Paso County Discrepancy Report No. 3

DRE Serial Number 145196 Time 4:33-4:40

1. Provide a detailed description of the issue (e.g. had to restart the test process because of significant error, equipment malfunction).

DRE CAMERA BECAME UNPLUGGED, MISSED BALLOTS
79-80

2. If applicable, record the test script number the team was executing: 79-80

3. Has this issue delayed or halted testing or will it impact expected results? Yes No
If yes, call your SOS contact, indicate the time of the call and document the discussion and resolution below:

DONT KNOW IF IT WILL AFFECT RESULTS

4. Does this issue require further action by the SOS Office? Yes No
If yes, describe the action required.

5. Ask the County Team Leader to review and, if the Team Leader approves the documentation above, sign off on this Report. Once the report has been signed, the Team Leader will record the appropriate information in the Discrepancy Log.

6. Report Completed by: NICK OSBORN

7. Report Reviewed and Approved by County Team Leader:

Nick Osborn



Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot

El Paso County Discrepancy Report No. 4

DRE Serial Number 145 251 Time 6:15

1. Provide a detailed description of the issue (e.g. had to restart the test process because of significant error, equipment malfunction).

SCRIPT WAS IN ERROR - CALLED FOR VOTING FOR JAY COOKING HAM, SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOM OXFORD

2. If applicable, record the test script number the team was executing: 94

3. Has this issue delayed or halted testing or will it impact expected results? Yes No
If yes, call your SOS contact, indicate the time of the call and document the discussion and resolution below:

CHECK SPREAD SHEET TO MAKE SURE CORRECT CANDIDATES ARE ADDED TO TOTAL

4. Does this issue require further action by the SOS Office? Yes No
If yes, describe the action required.

5. Ask the County Team Leader to review and, if the Team Leader approves the documentation above, sign off on this Report. Once the report has been signed, the Team Leader will record the appropriate information in the Discrepancy Log.

6. Report Completed by: Nick OSBORN

7. Report Reviewed and Approved by County Team Leader:

Nick Osborn

Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot

Hidalgo County Discrepancy Report No. 1

DRE Serial Number 5132670 & 5112990 Time 1:38 pm

1. Provide a detailed description of the issue (e.g. had to restart the test process because of significant error, equipment malfunction).

Per line #1 on Discrepancy log, Camera B lost power due loss of charge

2. If applicable, record the test script number the team was executing: Completed script #45

3. Has this issue delayed or halted testing or will it impact expected results? Yes No
If yes, call your SOS contact, indicate the time of the call and document the discussion and resolution below:

4. Does this issue require further action by the SOS Office? Yes No
If yes, describe the action required.

5. Ask the County Team Leader to review and, if the Team Leader approves the documentation above, sign off on this Report. Once the report has been signed, the Team Leader will record the appropriate information in the Discrepancy Log.

6. Report Completed by: ART GARCIA

7. Report Reviewed and Approved by County Team Leader:

Report not reviewed by County Official / Contact



Texas Secretary of State
November 7, 2006 Parallel Monitoring Pilot

Hidalgo County Discrepancy Report No. 2

DRE Serial Number 5B2620 & 5112990 Time 7Am

1. Provide a detailed description of the issue (e.g. had to restart the test process because of significant error, equipment malfunction).

Per line 2 & 2a, No zero-TAPE produced due to no printer Available; Printer located & available for conclusion of testing

2. If applicable, record the test script number the team was executing: n/a

3. Has this issue delayed or halted testing or will it impact expected results? Yes No
If yes, call your SOS contact, indicate the time of the call and document the discussion and resolution below:

4. Does this issue require further action by the SOS Office? Yes No
If yes, describe the action required.

5. Ask the County Team Leader to review and, if the Team Leader approves the documentation above, sign off on this Report. Once the report has been signed, the Team Leader will record the appropriate information in the Discrepancy Log.

6. Report Completed by: ART GARCIA

7. Report Reviewed and Approved by County Team Leader:

Report Not Reviewed by County Official /contc

APPENDIX G

Scripts Referenced In The Report

El Paso Script 29

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	10:24 10:32	Script # 29
	El Paso	Diebold	96	Time Ballot Cast:	10:32	
Tester:	KEVIN		Video:	Cliff Coats		
Observer	NICK		Machine:	B		
PART 2	Language: ENGLISH					
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester authorizes a new ballot with the Card Programmer, inserts it into the DRE to activate a ballot.						
3. The Tester selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an <i>Unscr Error</i> in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						

EI Paso County

Precinct Number: 96

Summary of Ballot Number: 29

Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
United States Senator	Barbara Ann Radnosky (DEM)	✓	✓				
United States Representative District 16	Silvestre Reyes (DEM)	✓	✓				
Governor	Carole Keaton Strayhorn (IND)	✓	✓				
Lieutenant Governor	Maria Luisa Alvarado (DEM)	✓	✓				
Attorney General	Jon Roland (LIB)	✓	✓				
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Mike Burnis (LIB)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Jeffrey Patterson (REP)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of Agriculture	Todd Staples (REP)	✓	✓				
Railroad Commissioner	Dale Henry (DEM)	✓	✓				
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Wallace Jefferson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	Wade Wilson (LIB)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	David M. Medina (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Nathan Hecht (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Phil Johnson (REP)	✓	✓				
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	J.R. Molina (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Barbara Parker Hervey (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Dave Howard (LIB)	✓	✓				
Member, State Board of Education, District 1	Rene Nunez (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Senator, District 29	Eliot Shapleigh (DEM)	✓	✓	U			EXPERIMENT WITH MARGO SAMPLE PLACEMENT
State Representative, District 75	Chente Quintanilla (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Ann Crawford McClure (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	David Wellington Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 120th Judicial District	Maria Salas-Mendoza (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 168th Judicial District	Guadalupe Rivera (DEM)	✓	✓				





Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 171st Judicial District	Bonnie Rangel (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 205th Judicial District	Kathleen H. Olivares (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 210th Judicial District	Gonzalo Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 243rd Judicial District	David C. Guaderrama (DEM)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 327th Judicial District	Linda Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Judge	Antonio "Anthony" Cobos (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	Ricardo Herrera (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Julie Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	Javier Alvarez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 5	Carlos Villa (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 6	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 7	Tom Spieczny (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 1	Alma R. Trejo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 2	Robert S. Archondo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	Yvonne Rodriguez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Eduardo Gamba (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Clerk	Gilbert Jesus Sanchez (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Clerk	Delia Briones (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Commissioner, Precinct No. 1 (Unexpired Term)	Luis C. Sarinana (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 4	Rosalio Munoz, Jr (DEM)	✓	✓				
[Review Screen]							

El Paso Script 79

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	4:33	Script # 79
	El Paso	Diebold	96	Time Ballot Cast:	4:38	
Tester:	NICK		Video:	Cliff Coats		
Observer:	LIZ		Machine: B			
PART 2	Language: English					
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester authorizes a new ballot with the Card Programmer, inserts it into the DRE to activate a ballot.						
3. The Tester selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an Unscripted Error in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						



El Paso County

Precinct Number: 96

Summary of Ballot Number: 79

Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
United States Senator	Barbara Ann Radnofsky (DEM)	✓	✓				
United States Representative District 16	Silvestre Reyes (DEM)	✓	✓				
Governor	Richard "Kinky" Friedman (IND)	✓	✓				
Lieutenant Governor	Maria Luisa Alvarado (DEM)	✓	✓				
Attorney General	David Van Os (DEM)	✓	✓				
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Fred Head (DEM)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Jerry Patterson (REP)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of Agriculture	Hank Gilbert (DEM)	✓	✓				
Railroad Commissioner	Dale Henry (DEM)	✓	✓				
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Wallace Jefferson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	Don Willett (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	David M. Medina (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Nathan Hecht (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Phil Johnson (REP)	✓	✓				
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	Sharon Keller (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Barbara Parker Hervey (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Charles Holcomb (REP)	✓	✓				
Member, State Board of Education, District 1	Rene Nunez (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Senator, District 29	Dee Margo (REP)	✓	✓				
State Representative, District 75	Chente Quintanilla (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals, District, Place 2	Ann Crawford McClure (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals, District, Place 3	David Wellington Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 129th Judicial District	Maria Salas-Mendoza (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 168th Judicial District	Guadalupe Rivera (DEM)	✓	✓				

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 171st Judicial District	Bonnie Rangel (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 205th Judicial District	Kathleen H. Olivares (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 210th Judicial District	Gonzalo Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 243rd Judicial District	David C. Guaderrama (DEM)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 327th Judicial District	Linda Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Judge	Antonio "Anthony" Cobos (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	Ricardo Herrera (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Julie Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	Javier Alvarez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	Alex Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 5	Carlos Villa (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 6	M. Sue Kurita (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 7	Tom Spieczny (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 1	Alma R. Trejo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 2	Robert S. Archondo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Eduardo Gamboa (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Clerk	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
County Clerk	Delta Britones (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Commissioner, Precinct No. 1 (Unexpired Term)	Daphne Love Hamilton (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 4	Rosalio Munoz, Jr. (DEM)	✓	✓				
[Review Screen]							



El Paso Script 80

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	4:38	Script # 80
	El Paso	Diebold	96	Time Ballot Cast:	4:41	
Tester:	NICK		Video:	Cliff Coats		
Observer:	LSZ		Machine: B			
PART 2	Language: English					
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester authorizes a new ballot with the Card Programmer, inserts it into the DRE to activate a ballot.						
3. The Tester selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an Unscripted Error in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						

El Paso County

Precinct Number: 96
 Summary of Ballot Number: 80
 Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	Democratic Party (DEM)	✓	✓				
United States Senator	Barbara Ann Radtsofsky (DEM)	✓	✓				
United States Representative District 16	Silvestre Reyes (DEM)	✓	✓				
Governor	Chris Bell (DEM)	✓	✓				
Lieutenant Governor	Maria Luisa Alvarado (DEM)	✓	✓				
Attorney General	David Van Os (DEM)	✓	✓				
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Fred Head (DEM)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Valinda Hattnsox (DEM)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of Agriculture	Hank Gilbert (DEM)	✓	✓				
Railroad Commissioner	Dale Henry (DEM)	✓	✓				
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Wallace Jefferson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	William E. "Bill" Moody (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	Jerry Adkins (LIB)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Nathan Hecht (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Jay H. Cookingham (LIB)	✓	✓				
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	J.R. Molina (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Quanah Parker (LIB)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Charles Holcomb (REP)	✓	✓				
Member, State Board of Education, District 1	Rene Nunez (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Senator, District 29	Eliot Shapleigh (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Representative, District 75	Chente Quintanilla (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Ann Crawford McClure (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	David Wellington Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 120th Judicial District	Maria Salas-Mendoza (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 168th Judicial District	Guadalupe Rivera (DEM)	✓	✓				



Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 171st Judicial District	Bonnie Rangel (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 205th Judicial District	Kathleen H. Olivares (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 210th Judicial District	Gonzalo Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 243rd Judicial District	David C. Guaderrama (DEM)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 327th Judicial District	Linda Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Judge	Antonio "Anthony" Cobos (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	Ricardo Herrera (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Julie Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	Javier Alvarez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	Alex Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 5	Carlos Villa (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 6	M. Sue Kurita (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 7	Tom Spieczny (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 1	Alma R. Trejo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 2	Robert S. Archondo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	Yvonne Rodriguez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Eduardo Gamboa (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Clerk	Gilbert Jesus Sanchez (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Clerk	Deia Briones (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Commissioner, Precinct No. 1 (Unexpired Term)	Luis C. Sainana (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 4	Rosalio Munoz, Jr (DEM)	✓	✓				
[Review Screen]							

El Paso Script 92

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	5:59	Script # 92
	El Paso	Diebold	96	Time Ballot Cast:	6:06	
Tester:	NICK		Video:	Cliff Coats		
Observer:	LIZ		Machine: A			
PART 2	Language: English					
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester authorizes a new ballot with the Card Programmer, inserts it into the DRE to activate a ballot.						
3. The Tester selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an <i>Unscripted Error</i> in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						



El Paso County

Precinct Number: 96

Summary of Ballot Number: 92

Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	Republican Party (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
United States Senator	Kay Bailey Hutchison (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
United States Representative District 16	Silvestre Reyes (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Governor	Rick Perry (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Lieutenant Governor	David Dewhurst (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Attorney General	Greg Abbott (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Susan Combs (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Jerry Patterson (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Commissioner of Agriculture	Todd Staples (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Railroad Commissioner	Elizabeth Ames Jones (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Wallace Jefferson (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	Don Willett (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	David M. Medina (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Nathan Hecht (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Phil Johnson (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	Sharon Keller (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Barbara Parker Hervey (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Charles Holcomb (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Member, State Board of Education, District 1	Rene Nunez (DEM)	✓	✓	U	✓	✓	ON REVIEW SCREEN, LISTED AS NO VOTE WENT BACK TO CANDIDATE
State Senator, District 29	Dee Margo (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
State Representative, District 75	Paul Johnson, Jr. (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Ann Crawford McClure (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	David Wellington Chew (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Judge, 120th Judicial District	Maria Salas-Mendoza (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Judge, 168th Judicial District	Guadalupe Rivera (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 171st Judicial District	Bonnie Rangel (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Judge, 205th Judicial District	Kathleen H. Olivares (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Judge, 240th Judicial District	Gonzalo Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Judge, 243rd Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓			✓	
Family District Judge, 327th Judicial District	Linda Chew (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
County Judge	Antonio "Anthony" Cobos (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	Ricardo Herrera (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Julie Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	Javier Alvarez (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	<No Vote>	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Court at Law No. 5	Carlos Villa (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Court at Law No. 6	M. Sue Kurita (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Court at Law No. 7	Tom Spieszny (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 1	Alma R. Trejo (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 2	Robert S. Archondo (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	Yvonne Rodriguez (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Eduardo Gamba (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
District Clerk	Gilbert Jesus Sanchez (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
County Clerk	Della Briones (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
County Commissioner, Precinct No. 1 (Unexpired Term)	Daphne Love Hamilton (REP)	✓	✓			✓	
Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 4	Rosalio Muncz, Jr (DEM)	✓	✓			✓	
[Review Screen]							

El Paso Script 94

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	6:10	Script # 94
	El Paso	Diebold	96	Time Ballot Cast:	6:19	
Tester:	NICK		Video:	Cliff Coats		
Observer:	LIZ		Machine: A			
PART 2	Language: English		Vote for Jay H. Cookingham (LIB) then change to Wallace Jefferson (REP) on the same screen.			
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester authorizes a new ballot with the Card Programmer, inserts it into the DRE to activate a ballot.						
3. The Tester selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an Unscripted Error in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						



El Paso County

Precinct Number: 96

Summary of Ballot Number: 94

Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
United States Senator	Barbara Ann Radoofsky (DEM)	✓	✓				
United States Representative District 16	Silvestre Reyes (DEM)	✓	✓				
Governor	Richard "Kinky" Friedman (IND)	✓	✓				
Lieutenant Governor	Maria Luisa Alvarado (DEM)	✓	✓				
Attorney General	David Van Os (DEM)	✓	✓				
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Fred Head (DEM)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Jerry Patterson (REP)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of Agriculture	Hank Gilbert (DEM)	✓	✓				
Railroad Commissioner	Tabitha Serrano (LIB)	✓	✓				
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Wallace Jefferson (REP)	✓	✓	S			Vote for Jay H. Cookingham (LIB) , then change to Wallace Jefferson (REP) on the same screen.
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	Don Willett (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	David M. Medina (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Nathan Hecht (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Phil Johnson (REP)	✓	✓				
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	J.R. Molina (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Barbara Parker Hervey (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Charles Holcomb (REP)	✓	✓				
Member, State Board of Education, District 1	Rene Nunez (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Senator, District 29	Eliot Shapleigh (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Representative, District 75	Chente Quintanilla (DEM)	✓	✓	U			voted for Johnson - Change to Chapman same SC
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Ann Crawford McClure (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 8th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	David Wellington Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 120th Judicial District	Maria Salas-Mendoza (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 168th Judicial District	Guadalupe Rivera (DEM)	✓	✓				

El Paso County
Precinct 96

Test Ballot # 94

Page 2 of 3



Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 171st Judicial District	Bonnie Rangel (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 205th Judicial District	Kathleen H. Olivares (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 210th Judicial District	Gonzalo Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 243rd Judicial District	David C. Guaderrama (DEM)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 327th Judicial District	Linda Chew (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Judge	Antonio "Anthony" Cobos (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	Ricardo Herrera (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Julie Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	Javier Alvarez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	Alex Gonzalez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 5	Carlos Villa (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 6	M. Sue Kurita (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 7	Tom Spieczny (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 1	Alma R. Trejo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court at Law No. 2	Robert S. Anchondo (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	Yvonne Rodriguez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Eduardo Gariboba (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Clerk	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
County Clerk	Delta Briones (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Commissioner, Precinct No. 1 (Unexpired Term)	Luis C. Sarinana (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justices of the Peace, Precinct No. 4	Rosalio Munoz, Jr. (DEM)	✓	✓				
[Review Screen]							

Harris Script 44

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	13:19	Script # 44
	Harris	Hart	0029-24	Time Ballot Cast:	13:25	
Tester:	AA		Video:	Ben Columbus		
Observer	AUB			B		
PART 2	Language: ENG					
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester generates a passcode from the JBC and staples it at the top right corner of this script.						
3. The Tester activates one of the DREs with the passcode, selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an <i>Unscripted Error</i> in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include <i>Scripted Errors</i> . These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						



Harris County

Precinct Number: 0029-24

Summary of Ballot Number: 44

Ballot Style: 1

	Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
1	Straight Party	Democratic Party (DEM)	✓	✓				
2	United States Senator	Barbara Ann Radnofsky (DEM)	✓	✓				
3	United States Representative, District 29	Gene Green (DEM)	✓	✓				
4	Governor	Chris Bell (DEM)	✓	✓				
5	Lieutenant Governor	Maria Luisa Alvarado (DEM)	✓	✓				
6	Attorney General	David Van Os (DEM)	✓	✓				
7	Comptroller of Public Accounts	Fred Head (DEM)	✓	✓				
8	Commissioner of the General Land Office	Valinda Hathcox (DEM)	✓	✓				
9	Commissioner of Agriculture	Hank Gilbert (DEM)	✓	✓				
10	Railroad Commissioner	Dale Henry (DEM)	✓	✓				
11	Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Wallace Jefferson (REP)	✓	✓				
12	Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	William E. "Bill" Moody (DEM)	✓	✓				
13	Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	Jerry Adkins (LIB)	✓	✓				
14	Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Nathan Hecht (REP)	✓	✓				
15	Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Jay H. Cookingham (LIB)	✓	✓				
16	Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	J.R. Molina (DEM)	✓	✓				
17	Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Barbara Parker Hervey (REP)	✓	✓				
18	Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Dave Howard (LIB)	✓	✓				
19	Member, State Board of Education, District 4	Lawrence A. Allen (DEM)	✓	✓				
20	State Representative, District 145	Richard J. (Rick) Noriega (DEM)	✓	✓				
21	Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Jane Bland (REP)	✓	✓				
22	Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 6	George C. Hanks, Jr (REP)	✓	✓				
23	Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 7	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
24	Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 8	Tim Tait (REP)	✓	✓				
25	Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 9	Jim Sharp (DEM)	✓	✓				

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr of Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	John S. Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 4	J. Harvey Hudson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 5	Wanda McKee Fowler (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 6	Leora T. Kahn (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 8	Charles Seymore (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 55th Judicial District	Jeff Brown (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 80th Judicial District, Unexpired Term	Larry Weirman (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 113th Judicial District	Patricia Hancock (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 157th Judicial District	Randy Wilson (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 180th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 182nd Judicial District	Jearmine Barr (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 183rd Judicial District	Robert Voigt (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 184th Judicial District	Jan Krocker (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 185th Judicial District	Randall Kallinen (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 189th Judicial District	Charles (Chuck) Silverman (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 190th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 208th Judicial District	Denise Collins (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 209th Judicial District	Michael McSpadden (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 228th Judicial District	Marc Carter (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 230th Judicial District	Belinda Hill (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 232nd Judicial District	Herb Ritchie (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 234th Judicial District	Reece Rondon (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 245th Judicial District	Mary Kay Green (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 246th Judicial District	Jim York (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 247th Judicial District	Bonnie Crane-Hellums (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 248th Judicial District	Lydia Clay-Jackson (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 257th Judicial District	Judy Warne (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 262nd Judicial District	Mike Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 263rd Judicial District	Jim Wallace (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 269th Judicial District	John T. Woodridge (REP)	✓	✓				

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Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
54 District Judge, 270th Judicial District	Brent Gamble (REP)	✓	✓				
7 District Judge, 280th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
8 District Judge, 281st Judicial District	David Bernal (REP)	✓	✓				
9 District Judge, 295th Judicial District	Tracy Elizabeth Christopher (REP)	✓	✓				
60 Family District Judge, 308th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
1 Family District Judge, 309th Judicial District	Frank Ryncd (REP)	✓	✓	✓			
2 Family District Judge, 310th Judicial District	Lisa Millard (REP)	✓	✓				
3 Family District Judge, 311th Judicial District	Doug Warne (REP)	✓	✓				
4 Family District Judge, 312th Judicial District	James D. Squier (REP)	✓	✓				
5 Family District Judge, 313th Judicial District	Pat Shelton (REP)	✓	✓				
6 Family District Judge, 314th Judicial District	John F. Phillips (REP)	✓	✓				
7 Family District Judge, 315th Judicial District	Bill Connolly (DEM)	✓	✓				
8 County Judge	Robert Eckels (REP)	✓	✓				
9 Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	R. Jack Cagle (REP)	✓	✓				
70 Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Jacqueline Lucchi Smith (REP)	✓	✓				
1 Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
2 Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	Roberta A. Lloyd (REP)	✓	✓				
3 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 1	Joan Nwuli (DEM)	✓	✓				
4 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 2	Silvia Pubchara (DEM)	✓	✓				
5 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 3	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
6 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 4	James E. Jim Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
7 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 5	Margaret Stewart Harris (REP)	✓	✓				
8 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 6	Lamy Standley (REP)	✓	✓				
9 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 7	Pam Derbyshire (REP)	✓	✓				
80 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 8	Alfred (Bud) Valdez (DEM)	✓	✓				
1 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 9	Randy E. Roll (DEM)	✓	✓				
2 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 10	Sherman A. Ross (REP)	✓	✓				
3 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 11	Diane Bull (REP)	✓	✓				
4 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 12	Robin Brown (REP)	✓	✓	✓			
5 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 13	Mark D. Atkinson (REP)	✓	✓				

NO SELECTION

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
86 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 14	Mike Fields (REP)	✓	✓				
7 Judge, County Criminal Court No. 15	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
8 Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	Russell Austin (REP)	✓	✓				
9 Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Mike Wood (REP)	✓	✓				
90 Judge, County Probate Court No. 3	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
1 Judge, County Probate Court No. 4	Bill McCulloch (REP)	✓	✓				
2 District Clerk	John Shike (DEM)	✓	✓				
3 County Clerk	James G. Pierre (DEM)	✓	✓				
4 County Treasurer	Richard Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
5 County School Trustee, Position 3, At Large	Andrew C. Burks, Jr. (DEM)	✓	✓				
6 County Commissioner, Precinct 2	Sylvia R. Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
7 Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 2, Place 2	George E. Risner (DEM)	✓	✓				
8 [Review Screen]							

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Harris Script 51

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	14:30	Script # 51
	Harris	Hart	0029-24	Time Ballot Cast:	14:37	
Tester:	MB3		Video:	Ben Columbus		
Observer:	AA			A		
PART 2	Language: ENH		Vote for Susan Combs (REP), then change to Fred Head (DEM) on the same scree			
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester generates a passcode from the JBC and staples it at the top right corner of this script.						
3. The Tester activates one of the DREs with the passcode, selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an Unscripted Error in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						

Harris County

Precinct Number: 0029-24

Summary of Ballot Number: 51

Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
United States Senator	Kay Bailey Hutchison (REP)	✓	✓				
United States Representative, District 29	Gene Green (DEM)	✓	✓				
Governor	Carole Keeton Strayhorn (IND)	✓	✓				
Lieutenant Governor	David Dewhurst (REP)	✓	✓				
Attorney General	David Van Os (DEM)	✓	✓				
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Fred Head (DEM)	✓	✓	S	✓	✓	Vote for Susan Combs (REP), then change to Fred Head (DEM) on the same screen.
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Jerry Patterson (REP)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of Agriculture	Todd Staples (REP)	✓	✓				
Railroad Commissioner	Tabitha Serrano (LIB)	✓	✓				
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Wallace Jefferson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	William E. "Bill" Moody (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	David M. Medina (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Nathan Hecht (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	Jay H. Cookingham (LIB)	✓	✓				
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	J.R. Molina (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Barbara Parker Hervey (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	Charles Holcomb (REP)	✓	✓				
Member, State Board of Education, District 4	Lawrence A. Allen (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Representative, District 145	Richard J. (Rick) Norega (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Jane Bland (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 6	George C. Hanks, Jr. (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 7	Terry Jennings (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 8	Tim Taft (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 9	Elsa Alcalá (REP)	✓	✓				

Harris County
Precinct 0029-24

Test Ballot # 51

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Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr of Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 4	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 5	Wanda McKee Fowler (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 6	Richard Edelman (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 8	Charles Seymore (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 55th Judicial District	Jeff Brown (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 80th Judicial District, Unexpired Term	Lary Weiman (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 113th Judicial District	Patricia Hancock (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 157th Judicial District	Randy Wilson (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 180th Judicial District	Debbie Mantooth Stricklin (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 182nd Judicial District	Jeanine Barr (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 183rd Judicial District	Vanessa Velasquez (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 184th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 185th Judicial District	Susan Brown (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 189th Judicial District	Bill Burke (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 190th Judicial District	Jennifer W. Elrod (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 208th Judicial District	Denise Collins (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 209th Judicial District	Michael McSpadden (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 228th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 230th Judicial District	Belinda Hill (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 232nd Judicial District	Mary Lou Keel (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 234th Judicial District	Reece Rondon (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 245th Judicial District	Annette Galik (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 246th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 247th Judicial District	Bonnie Crane Hellums (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 248th Judicial District	Joan Campbell (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 257th Judicial District	Judy Wame (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 262nd Judicial District	Mike Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 263rd Judicial District	Jim Wallace (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 269th Judicial District	John T. Woodridge (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 270th Judicial District	Brent Gambie (REP)	✓	✓				

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 280th Judicial District	Tony Lindsay (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 281st Judicial District	David Bernal (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 295th Judicial District	Tracy Elizabeth Christopher (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 308th Judicial District	Georgia Dempster (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 309th Judicial District	Frank Rynd (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 310th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 311th Judicial District	Doug Warne (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 312th Judicial District	James D. Schlier (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 313th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 314th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 315th Judicial District	Michael "Mike" Schneider (REP)	✓	✓				
County Judge	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	R. Jack Cagle (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	Roberta A. Lloyd (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 1	Reagan Cartwright Helm (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 2	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 3	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 4	James E. "Jim" Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 5	Margaret Stewart Harris (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 6	Larry Standley (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 7	Pam Depbyshire (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 8	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 9	Analia Wilkerson (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 10	Sherman A. Ross (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 11	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 12	Robin Brown (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 13	Mark D. Atkinson (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 14	Mike Fields (REP)	✓	✓				

Should have been Voted → Was Not No 8





Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 15	Jean Spradling Hughes (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	Russell Austin (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Mike Wood (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 3	Rory Robert Olsen (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 4	Bill McCulloch (REP)	✓	✓				
District Clerk	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
County Clerk	Beverly B. Kaufman (REP)	✓	✓				
County Treasurer	Orlando Sanchez (REP)	✓	✓				
County School Trustee, Position 3, At Large	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
County Commissioner, Precinct 2	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 2, Place 2	George E. Risner (DEM)	✓	✓				
[Review Screen]		✓	✓				

Harris Script 53

PART 1	County	Vendor	Precinct	Start time:	14:58	Script # 53
	Harris	Hart	0029-24	Time Ballot Cast:	14:53	
Tester:	TWA		Video:	Ben Columbus		
Observer	AB		(B)			
PART 2	Language: ENG		None			
PART 3						
1. The Tester records the start time as shown on the test clock. The Tester displays the Test Script Number so the video camera can get a good view of the script number. Tester announces the script number and any alerts noted in the Alert box.						
2. The Tester generates a passcode from the JBC and staples it at the top right corner of this script.						
3. The Tester activates one of the DREs with the passcode, selects a language and records the language choice in the <i>Language</i> box above. The Tester passes the script to the Observer.						
4. The Observer announces each contest or measure on the attached ballot script and the selection to make for that contest or measure. The Tester makes the selection on the DRE. The Observer checks the <i>Voted</i> column after the selection is made. Ensure that the announcement is clear enough for the videocamera to record it.						
5. If the Tester makes an error in voting, for instance choosing the wrong candidate, the error may be corrected immediately on the same screen. The tester should notify the Observer that the original vote or action was in error and should be corrected. The Observer will record it as an <i>Unscripted Error</i> in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column on the voting script.						
6. Some ballots include Scripted Errors. These are indicated by an S in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column. See instructions in the <i>Explanation or Instructions</i> column for how to enter the error and how to handle it. The Observer will instruct the Tester how to vote the error according to the script.						
7. Tester stops at the confirmation/review screen after finishing any final script instructions that are required. The tester then calls out the selections as they appear on the confirmation/review screen.						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If a selection is verified as correct, the Observer checks the <i>Valid</i> column. • If a selection is verified as incorrect, the Observer enters U in the <i>Scr or Unscr Error</i> column, and informs the Tester of the correction that is needed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Tester makes all the corrections noted by the Observer and returns to the confirmation screen and begins step 7 again. 						
6. When all selections are confirmed as correct, the Tester casts the ballot and records the finish time.						





Harris County

Precinct Number: 0029-24

Summary of Ballot Number: 53

Ballot Style: 1

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Straight Party	Democratic Party (DEM)	✓	✓				
United States Senator	Barbara Ann Radnofsky (DEM)	✓	✓				
United States Representative, District 29	Gene Green (DEM)	✓	✓				
Governor	Chris Bell (DEM)	✓	✓				
Lieutenant Governor	Maria Luisa Alvarado (DEM)	✓	✓				
Attorney General	David Van Os (DEM)	✓	✓				
Comptroller of Public Accounts	Fred Head (DEM)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of the General Land Office	Valinda Hatfield (DEM)	✓	✓				
Commissioner of Agriculture	Hank Gilbert (DEM)	✓	✓				
Railroad Commissioner	Dale Henry (DEM)	✓	✓				
Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Unexpired Term	Tom Oxford (LIB)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 2	William E. "Bill" Moody (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 4	Jerry Adkins (LIB)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 6	Todd Phillips (LIB)	✓	✓				
Justice, Supreme Court, Place 8, Unexpired Term	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals	J.R. Molina (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 7	Quanah Parker (LIB)	✓	✓				
Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Place 8	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Member, State Board of Education, District 4	Lawrence A. Allen (DEM)	✓	✓				
State Representative, District 145	Richard J. (Rick) Noriega (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 2	Jane Bland (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 6	George C. Hanks, Jr. (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 7	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 8	Tim Tate (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 1st Court of Appeals District, Place 9	Jim Sharp (DEM)	✓	✓				

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 3	John S. Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 4	J. Harvey Hudson (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 5	Wanda McKee Fowler (REP)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 6	Leora T. Kahn (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice, 14th Court of Appeals District, Place 8	Charles Seymour (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 55th Judicial District	Jeff Brown (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 80th Judicial District, Unexpired Term	Larry Weiman (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 113th Judicial District	Patricia Hancock (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 157th Judicial District	Randy Wilson (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 180th Judicial District	Debbie Mantooth Stricklin (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 182nd Judicial District	Jeanine Barr (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 183rd Judicial District	Robert Voigt (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 184th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 185th Judicial District	Randall Kallinen (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 189th Judicial District	Charles (Chuck) Silverman (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 190th Judicial District	Jennifer W. Elrod (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 208th Judicial District	Denise Collins (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 209th Judicial District	Michael McSpadden (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 228th Judicial District	Marc Carter (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 230th Judicial District	Belinda Hill (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 232nd Judicial District	Herb Ritchie (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 234th Judicial District	Reece Rondon (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 245th Judicial District	Mary Kay Green (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 246th Judicial District	Jim York (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 247th Judicial District	Bonnie Crane Heliums (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 248th Judicial District	Lydia Clay-Jackson (DEM)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 257th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 262nd Judicial District	Mike Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 263rd Judicial District	Jim Wallace (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 269th Judicial District	John T. Woodridge (REP)	✓	✓				





Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Scr or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
District Judge, 270th Judicial District	Brent Gamble (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 280th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
District Judge, 281st Judicial District	David Bernal (REP)	✓	✓				
District Judge, 295th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 308th Judicial District	Georgia Dempster (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 309th Judicial District	Frank Rynd (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 310th Judicial District	Lisa Millard (REP)	✓	✓				shld have been voted / NOT VOTED No
Family District Judge, 311th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 312th Judicial District	James D. Squier (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 313th Judicial District	Pat Shelton (REP)	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 314th Judicial District	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Family District Judge, 315th Judicial District	Bill Connolly (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Judge	Robert Eckels (REP)	✓	✓	✓			
Judge, County Court at Law No. 1	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 2	Jacqueline Lucel Smith (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 3	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Court at Law No. 4	Robert A. Lloyd (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 1	Joan Nwuli (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 2	Silvia Pubhara (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 3	Don Jackson (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 4	James E. "Jim" Anderson (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 5	Margaret Stewart Harris (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 6	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 7	Pam Derbyshire (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 8	Alfred (Bud) Valdez (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 9	Randy E. Roll (DEM)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 10	<No Vote>	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 11	Diane Bull (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 12	Robin Brown (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 13	Mark D. Atkinson (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 14	<No Vote>	✓	✓				

Contest	Candidate	Voted	Valid	Set or Unscr. Error	Re-Voted	Re-Valid	Explanation or Instructions
Judge, County Criminal Court No. 15	Jean Spradling Hughes (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 1	<No Votes>						
Judge, County Probate Court No. 2	Mike Wood (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 3	Rory Robert Olsen (REP)	✓	✓				
Judge, County Probate Court No. 4	Bill McCulloch (REP)	✓	✓				
District Clerk	John Shike (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Clerk	James G. Pierre (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Treasurer	Richard Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
County School Trustee, Position 3, At Large	Andrew C. Burks, Jr. (DEM)	✓	✓				
County Commissioner, Precinct 2	Sylvia R. Garcia (DEM)	✓	✓				
Justice of the Peace, Precinct No. 2, Place 2	George E. Risner (DEM)	✓	✓				
[Review Screen]							

APPENDIX H

Scripts Referenced In The Report

The appendix of voting scripts for El Paso County is not included in this report because of the large size of the document.

However, the scripts have been provided to the Texas Secretary of State.

APPENDIX I

Scripts Referenced In The Report

The appendix of voting scripts for Harris County is not included in this report because of the large size of the document.

However, the scripts have been provided to the Texas Secretary of State.

APPENDIX J

Scripts Referenced In The Report

The appendix of voting scripts for Hidalgo County is not included in this report because of the large size of the document.

However, the scripts have been provided to the Texas Secretary of State.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Brennan Report - “The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections In An Electronic World”, The Brennan Center Task Force On Voting System Security, Lawrence Norden, Chair, Voting Rights & Elections Series, Brennan Center For Justice At NYU School Of Law (www.brennancenter.org)

CCTV - Closed-Circuit Television is the use of video cameras to transmit a signal to a specific, limited set of monitors. It differs from broadcast television in that the signal is not openly transmitted, though it may employ point to point wireless links. CCTV is often used for surveillance in areas which need security, such as banks, casinos, and airports or military installations. CCTV systems may operate continuously or only as required to monitor a particular event.

Closing the Polls - The steps necessary to and act of shutting down the voting mechanism, such that no further citizen voting inputs are accepted on Election Day, usually by an agreed upon time.

Crossover Vote - For the purpose this project, a crossover vote is one in which a Straight Party (e.g. Republican Party) is chosen, and then some subset of the pre-defined votes are changed to reflect a different party affiliation.

CVR - Cast Vote Records show what votes were cast on each voting device. The Cast Vote Record provides a means of recounting votes and ensuring that results are accurate.

Diebold Incorporated - A company that manufactures electronic voting machines such as AccuVote - TSX, AccuVote - TS, AccuVote - OS, VoteRemote Suite, and others.

DRE - A Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machine records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter; that processes data by means of a computer program; and that records voting data and ballot images in memory components.

Early Voting - The process which voters can cast their vote on a single or series of days prior to an election. Early voting can take place remotely, such as by mail, or in person, usually in designated early voting polling stations. The availability and time periods for early voting vary based on jurisdiction and type of election. In many U.S. states the period varies between four and fifty days prior to Election Day. Early voting can be considered synonymous with “no-excuse” absentee voting. The goal of early voting is usually to increase participation and relieve congestion of polling stations on Election Day.

Elections Warehouse - Location where DRE equipment is stored. Polling sites obtain their equipment from and return it to the Elections Warehouse.

ENG - ENG is a broadcasting (usually television) industry acronym which stands for **E**lectronic **N**ews **G**athering. It can mean anything from a lone reporter taking a single camcorder out to get a story to an entire television crew taking a satellite truck on location to do a live report for a newscast. In its early days, the term ENG was used by newsroom staff to differentiate between the NG (newsgathering) crews that collected tv news with traditional film cameras and the new ENG crews who collected tv news with new electronic analogue tape formats like low band U-matic. The requirement for the differentiation stems from the radically different methods of post-production involved in video versus film. Film needed to be processed before editing, unlike tape where footage could be edited fairly quickly, thus dramatically reducing the turn-around time for a story.

ES&S - **E**lectronic **S**ystems & **S**oftware Inc., a company based in Omaha, NE, that manufactures the iVotronic voting machine.

eSlate[®] - The device that voters use to cast their ballots. eSlate is about the size of a legal pad. Ballots are presented to the voter on a durable color screen. Selections are made by using an integrated rotary optical encoder.

iVotronic - A DRE voting machine manufactured by Electronic Systems & Software Inc.

Hart - Hart InterCivic, Inc. makes electronic voting equipment and document management software for state and local governments

JBC - Judge Booth Controller which manages the election process in each precinct; enables the election official to know which booths are in use at any given time; issues access codes for voting; and presents each voter with the appropriate ballot style. The JBC can control up to 12 eSlate units.

Malware - **Malicious Software** is software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the owner's informed consent. It is a portmanteau of the words "malicious" and "software". The expression is a general term used by computer professionals to mean a variety of forms of hostile, intrusive, or annoying software or program code. Software is considered malware based on the perceived intent of the creator rather than any particular features. It includes computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware, adware, and other malicious and unwanted software. In law, malware is sometimes known as a "computer contaminant". Malware should not be confused with defective software, that is, software which has a legitimate purpose but contains harmful bugs.

MBB - **M**obile **B**allot **B**ox[™] is eSlate's reusable, portable, flash memory PC card. Used to store election information, the MBB is the link among all components of the eSlate System. Each MBB is uniquely serialized for each election and tracked by the Ballot Origination Software System (BOSS) and Tally applications. When inserted into the Judge's Booth Controller, the MBB supplies election information and ballot styles at the polling place and stores the cast votes. Because the MBB uses solid-state, non-volatile memory storage, no batteries or constant power supplies are required to maintain data.

MiniDV - Digital Video (DV) is a digital video format launched in 1994, and, in its smaller tape form factor MiniDV, has since become a standard for home and semiprofessional video production; it is sometimes used for professional purposes as well, such as filmmaking and electronic news gathering. The DV specification (originally known as the Blue Book, current official name IEC 61834) defines both the codec and the tape format. Features include intraframe compression for uncomplicated editing, a standard interface for transfer to non-linear editing systems (FireWire also known as IEEE 1394), and good video quality, especially compared to earlier consumer analog formats such as 8 mm, Hi-8 and VHS-C. DV now enables filmmakers to produce movies inexpensively, and is strongly associated with independent film and citizen journalism.

Opening the Polls - The steps necessary to and the act of having the voting mechanism ready to accept citizen voting inputs on Election Day, usually by an agreed upon time.

Parallel Testing, Parallel Monitoring - The process of conducting mock voting on selected DREs on election day in order to detect software and security flaws. This differs from pre-election testing, which may not detect security attacks set to initiate only on election day.

PC card - See **PCMCIA**

PCMCIA - Personal Computer Memory Card International Association, and pronounced as separate letters. PCMCIA is an organization that has developed a standard for small, credit card-sized devices called PC Cards. Originally designed for adding memory to portable computers, the PCMCIA standard has been expanded several times and is now suitable for many types of devices

PEB - Personal Electronic Ballot is a portable data bank which holds the ballot styles for the election. This can be programmed to carry images, text, and also multiple languages. The PEB is inserted by the pollworker. This downloads the appropriate ballot for the voter into the iVotronic.

Pilot Test - A Pilot Test is a precursor to a full-scale study or test. Usually conducted with a smaller sample size than the full study, a pilot is generally intended to test experimental procedures and to obtain information useful for conducting power calculations.

RFID - Radio Frequency Identification is a technology that uses electronic tags for storing data. RFID tags are also known as “electronic labels,” but are more accurately described as transponders. They are made up of an RFID chip attached to an antenna. RFID chips may be battery-powered or derive their power from the radio frequency waves from the RFID reader. RFID tags are most often used to identify items in the same way bar codes are. But RFID tags do not require an optical scanner, and they can be embedded and read from within packages. RFID-tagged items can be identified much faster and more accurately than bar-coded items.

SOS - Office of the Secretary Of State, Texas

Straight Party Vote - Choosing the voting option to vote only within the confines of a particular party, i.e. Democratic, Republican, Libertarian, or Independent.

Tamper-Proof or Tamper-Evident Seal - A seal or tag which when broken would be

both obvious and visible.

Test Script - A list of directions for testing purposes. A known outcome is listed so that the actual outcome can be compared to what is expected.

Test Team - The finite group conducting all the test parameters for a particular County in the Parallel Monitoring project.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Jones, Douglas, *Testing Voting Systems*, Voting and Elections.
<<http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/testing.shtml>> (accessed November 20, 2006)
- ² R&G ASSOCIATES, LLC. 2005. Parallel Monitoring Program Special Statewide Election November 8, 2005 Report of Findings, Sacramento: State of California, Secretary of State
<http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/2005_pmp_report_final.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2006)
- ³ Jones, Douglas, Voting and Elections, <<http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/>> (November 20, 2006)
- ⁴ California Institute of Technology, Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project,
<<http://www.vote.caltech.edu/>> (November 20, 2006)
- ⁵ "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World", pp 23-30, Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security, Lawrence Norden, Chair, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, New York, NY, 2005
- ⁶ Texas Secretary of State, *Online Poll Worker Training*, Elections & Voter information,
<<http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/onlinepollworker.shtml>> (November 20, 2006)
- ⁷ "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World", Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security, Lawrence Norden, Chair, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, New York, NY, 2005.
- ⁸ R&G ASSOCIATES, LLC. 2005. Parallel Monitoring Program Special Statewide Election November 8, 2005 Report of Findings. Sacramento: State of California, Secretary of State
<http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/2005_pmp_report_final.pdf> (November 20, 2006)
- ⁹ The Brennan Center for Justice, *Voting Technology*,
<http://www.brennancenter.org/subpage.asp?key=38&init_key=105> (November 20, 2006)
- ¹⁰ The Federal Election Commission Help America Vote Act of 2002,
<<http://www.fec.gov/hava/hava.htm>> (November 20, 2006)
- ¹¹ Diebold Election Systems, *Demos*, <<http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/demos.asp>> (November 20, 2006).
- ¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Hart intercivic, *How to Vote Video*,
<<http://www.hartintercivic.com/innerpage.php?pageid=114>> (November 20, 2006)

¹⁴ Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Electronic Voting Machine Information Sheet (Hart InterCivic – eSlate 3000)*, E-voting, <http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/20040818_hart_eslate_v0.8.pdf#search=%22hart%20eslate%20voting%20system%20%22> (November 20, 2006)

¹⁵ McLennan County, Texas, *McLennan County eSlate Installation Frequently Asked Questions*, Elections Office, <<http://www.co.mclennan.tx.us/elections/eslate/5faqs.html>> (November 20, 2006)

¹⁶ *The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World*, pp 23-30, Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security, Lawrence Norden, Chair, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, New York, NY, 2005.