



**Achieving Locally-Controlled Elections in Anoka County**

**Presented by**

**Anoka County  
Election Integrity Team (ACEIT)**

**To**

**City of Ramsey**

**April 23, 2024**

**SUMMARY  
FINDINGS  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
RESOLUTIONS**




**Anoka County  
Election Integrity  
Team  
(ACEIT)**

**We ask the Anoka County Commissioners, Mayors,  
City Council and School Board Members to vote for  
Secure, Transparent and Locally-Controlled Elections**


# SUMMARY | RECOMMENDATIONS

## I. Graph: City of Ramsey, Registered Voters Per Precinct, 2010-2022



**5 of 9 precincts over 2,000 so time to rebalance and add 1 or 2 precincts:  
Resolution #2**

## II. Graph: City of Ramsey, Ballots Cast In-Person & Mail-In: 2010-2022



**The growth of absentee ballots suggests the need for more local control:  
Resolutions # 9 & 10**

## III. Summary/Recommendations

- Small Voting Precincts
- Secured Election Judge Data
- Verified Registered Voters
- Validated Paper Ballots
- Paper Poll Books
- Hand Counted Paper Ballots

- Resolutions #1, #2**
- Resolutions #3, #4**
- Resolution #11**
- Resolutions #9, #10 & #11**
- Resolution #5**
- Resolutions #6, #7, #8**

## IV. Reports Available

- a.** Hand Count Feasibility Study
- b.** Expanded PER Analysis

- Request Study**
- Request Report**

## V. Recommended Actions

**Adopt Resolutions**

## GOAL #4: Validate Paper Ballots

- Absentee mail-in ballots have a greater risk of fraud
- The proportion of absentee ballots is growing
- Counterfeit resistant ballots are available and should be used
- Cities should administer all absentee ballots including mail-ins
- *MN 2022 Absentee Voting Administration Guide*

## GOAL #5: Use Paper Poll Books

- Electronic poll pads are not worth the risk
- Returning to using **ONLY** paper poll books for a safe voter check in
- Paper works and it is cheaper
- Many precincts in Minnesota use paper **ONLY**

## GOAL #6: Hand-Count Paper Ballots

- Counting of votes is now hidden
- Cast Vote Record audits are inaccessible
- Post-Election Review (PER) audits are inadequate
- Use of tabulators is now mandated (MS 206.58)
- PERs can be expanded for precincts and offices
- Hand Counting votes after polls close is possible (MS 204C.19)
- Hand counting time and costs can be calculated
- Hand counting is feasible for competitive offices
- Hand counting is secure and transparent
- Hand counting raises the public's level of confidence in our elections

We need transparent, verifiable, and auditable counting for public trust

And send a message:

*Don't mess with Anoka County, don't mess with my city*

# SMALL VOTING PRECINCTS: RES #1

## RESOLUTION 2024-

CITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
COUNTY OF ANOKA  
STATE OF MINNESOTA

### RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING PRECINCT AND POLLING LOCATIONS FOR 2024 ELECTION YEAR

**WHEREAS**, Minnesota Statute 204B.16, subd. 1 requires the governing body of each municipality to designate by ordinance or resolution each year no later than December 31st, polling places for each election precinct; and

**WHEREAS**, the polling places designated by resolution by December of each year are the polling places to be used for elections in the following calendar year unless a change is made;

**NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED** that the polling locations to be used for municipal precincts in calendar year 2024 are as follows:

Precinct #1 –

Precinct #2 –

Precinct #3 –

Precinct #4 –

Approved this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2024.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_, Mayor

ATTEST: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, City Clerk

(Seal)

# ELECTION JUDGE APPOINTMENTS: RES #3

RESOLUTION 2024-

CITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
COUNTY OF ANOKA  
STATE OF MINNESOTA

## RESOLUTION APPOINTING ELECTION JUDGES FOR THE 2024 PRIMARY AND GENERAL ELECTION

**WHEREAS**, The City Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_ is required by M.S. 204B.21, Sec 2, to officially approve the appointment of election judges; and

**WHEREAS**, the City of \_\_\_\_\_ City Council hereby adopts the judges listed on Exhibit A, hereto attached, as the official judges for the \_\_\_\_\_ Election, with the understanding that amendments may be necessary to the appointments in order to fill vacancies and achieve political party balance.

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED**, by the City Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_ that the names listed on Exhibit A, hereto attached, are the Official Election Judges for the City of \_\_\_\_\_ 2024 General Election.

**FURTHER RESOLVED**, election judges will be paid based on the following schedule:

Head Judge \$ \_\_\_\_\_ plus mileage for training and meetings  
Assistance Head Judge \$ \_\_\_\_\_ plus mileage for training  
Election Judge \$ \_\_\_\_\_ plus mileage for training

Adopted by the City Council this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2024

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_, Mayor

ATTEST: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, City Clerk

(SEAL)

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED**, by the City Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_ requests that Anoka County respond to the following questions:

1. Where is election judge personal data stored?
2. What measures are in place to secure this data?

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED**, by the City Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_, Minnesota hereby requests that Anoka County take actions to:

1. End the contract with InTech for election operations
2. Take all precautions and measures to retrieve all shared data from InTech
3. Sever all connectivity and access InTech has to Anoka County and Municipality data
4. Ensure data is not stored in the Cloud, but rather is kept and managed on local equipment

Adopted by the City Council this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2024

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_, Mayor

ATTEST: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, City Clerk  
(SEAL)

## Data Security Risks in Outsourcing

### Outsourcing = Sharing = Loss of Control

#### **Unlimited Risk**

- Data shared with Modus/InTech, an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization), and cannot be FOIA'd
- Data transferred electronically (online) to others is **hackable**
- Data shared/stored in the Cloud and/or on others' PCs or on devices is **hackable**
- Encryption doesn't eliminate risk; it is **hacked** every day
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Party/Contractors that transfer data know the data is **hackable** and, thus, infuse language in their contracts that hold them harmless because they know this truth
- Data sent/shared cannot be controlled and therefore poses a **security threat** to the Election Judge

### Inhouse on Local PC

#### **Zero to Limited Risk**

- Save/store file(s) only on a dedicated local PC, not in the AC files in the Cloud

- Produce election night reporting
- Update voter rolls minutes before an election in near-real time
- Be intercepted for unethical, even unlawful, monitoring and manipulation

**WHEREAS**, suspected security risks have been identified including:

- The Department of Homeland Security’s CISA Department uses the Albert System and FirstNet, which may have access to voting systems through the poll pads.
- Poll pads have been used as a digital ledger to add, delete, and shift large numbers of voters to achieve the desired vote counts.
- Poll pads have been used to report vote totals down to the County from the secretary of state (e.g. New Mexico)

**WHEREAS**, as per M.S. 201.225, subd. 1, a municipality may use an electronic roster system for any election but it is not mandated; and

**WHEREAS**, there is no evidence of a formal agreement between Anoka County and the municipalities requiring municipalities to continuously use electronic roster system for any election; and

**WHEREAS**, a paper backup system is required as a backup to the electronic poll pads as per:

- M.S. 201 subd. 2: “Each precinct using electronic rosters shall have a paper backup system approved by the secretary of state present at the polling place to use in the event that the election judges are unable to use the electronic roster”
- M.S. 201.225, subd. 5 (b) which states: “Each precinct using electronic rosters shall have a paper backup system approved by the secretary of state present at the polling place to use in the event that the election judges are unable to use the electronic roster”; and

**WHEREAS**, this system is an on-going security risk and costly to taxpayers;

**NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED** that the City of \_\_\_\_\_ chooses to opt out of use of electronic poll pads and return to paper poll books.

Adopted this \_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2024

# HAND COUNTED PAPER BALLOTS: RES #6

RESOLUTION NO. 2024-\_\_\_\_

CITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
ANOKA COUNTY  
STATE OF MINNESOTA

## RESOLUTION TO HAND COUNT BALLOTS/VOTES AT PRECINCTS IN 2024 PRIMARY & GENERAL ELECTIONS

**WHEREAS**, free and fair elections are the bedrock supporting the superstructure of our constitutional republic and local voting precincts are the building blocks of our democratic process; and

**WHEREAS**, our election system is a fair, efficient and cost-effective means to select public officials who then make decisions about government programs and services amounting to millions, billions and even trillions of dollars at all governmental levels; and

**WHEREAS**, on January 6, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated as critical infrastructure the U.S. election systems including voting machines, registration databases, polling locations and voting storage facilities thereby recognizing the need for vigilant protection from fraud, corruption and cyber attack either foreign or domestic; and

**WHEREAS**, current Minnesota law, as recently amended, mandates the continued use of an electronic voting system (i.e. vote tabulator-M.S. 206.56, subd. 8) for state elections (206.58) but there is no provision preventing a municipality from conducting a parallel hand count of all or some of the ballots and votes; and

**WHEREAS**, the governing body of a municipality shall give approval before an electronic voting system may be adopted or used in the municipality (206.58) which was effectively done by the City/Township of \_\_\_\_\_ under the Joint Powers Agreement, as amended, and referenced as Anoka County Contract No. C0008996 and dated November, 2021; and

**WHEREAS**, Minnesota Statutes empower municipalities (cities and townships) to create voting precincts (204B.14), establish polling places (204B.16), appoint and employ election judges (204B.21) and administer election-day activities at the polls (204C) including the hand counting of ballots and votes in each precinct (204C.19) using the piling system (204C.21).

3. The Finance Director shall also create a Special Project Fund which may receive public donations which are tax deductible by the contributor to be used solely to offset said hand counting expenses and said Fund shall continue year to year with any remaining balance to carry forward for future hand counting projects.

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED** that the Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_ hereby requests that Anoka County Auditor/Elections Department receive, archive and consider the results of the hand count in the City of \_\_\_\_\_ and consider any necessary actions before completing its official canvass and final report to the Minnesota Secretary of State.

**BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED** that the City of \_\_\_\_\_ hereby acknowledges that the electronic voting system (“tabulation machines”) provides the certifiable basis for reporting results to the Secretary of State but any differences between the tabulation machines and the hand count should be taken seriously and resolved in a manner consist with the general guidelines of MN Statutes 206.89 and therefore duly reviewed further, if necessary, to resolve the cause of any deviations. The Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_ is prepared to fully cooperate with any such review.

Adopted this \_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2024

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Mayor

ATTEST \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
City Clerk  
(SEAL)

**Black Box Voting Keeps Getting Darker in Minnesota**

2023 Law Changes

- ✓ **Vote tabulation machines** mandated if used before in Federal/State elections (MS 206.58)
- ✓ **Cast Vote Records** rendered useless for auditing (MS 206.845)  
(This federally prescribed auditing tool built into tabulators cannot be used to audit elections)

2024 Laws Proposed

- **Hand counting** at the polls to be rendered impossible (HF 4772, SF 4729)
- No residential address needed to register and vote (HF 4772, SF 4729)
- Voting stations at Colleges & Universities to be authorized (HF 4772)

**Trust Machines**

**Do Not Audit**

**Do Not Hand Count Votes**

~~CASH YOUR VOTE RECORDS~~

voting system to determine if the counting accuracy of the voting system meets a defined standard”; and

**WHEREAS**, M.S. 206.89, subd. 3 requires a certain minimum number of **precincts** in general elections are identified in this audit but no maximum is required as follows: “The county canvassing board of a county with over 100,000 registered voters must conduct a review of a total of **at least** four precincts, or three percent of the total number of precincts in the county, whichever is greater”; and

**WHEREAS**, M.S. 206.89, subd. 3 requires a certain minimum number of **offices** in general elections to be audited via hand count but no maximum is identified as follows: “The postelection review must be conducted of the votes cast for president or governor; United States senator; and United States representative. The postelection review official may conduct postelection review of the votes cast for **additional offices**”; and

**WHEREAS**, this requirement does not apply to presidential primaries, state primaries, special elections or any local offices in general elections and as a result these elections have never been audited ; and

**WHEREAS**, this general election sample is usually statistically less than 0.3% of all choices made by voters in a general election and not statistically robust enough to demonstrate statistical confidence levels; and

**WHEREAS**, hand counting of ballots and votes is in the public interest to provide transparency and verification of results, deter tampering or cyberattack, restore voter confidence and promote voter participation in the electoral process; and

**WHEREAS**, election judges must be paid “an amount fixed by the governing body of the city” but “may elect to serve without payment by submitting a written statement” (204B.31);

**WHEREAS**, M.S. 205.89, subd. 9 (1) states that “the governing body responsible for each precinct selected for review must pay the costs incurred for the review”; and

**WHEREAS**, the City Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_ acknowledges, accepts and is prepared to pay the costs of conducting the PER for precincts in the City of \_\_\_\_\_;

## WHY HAND COUNT?

- Counting of votes is now hidden
  - Outsourced to NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations)
  - Commercialized—controlled by private companies
  - Proprietary—electronic source codes hidden
  - Private—not subject to Freedom of Information requests
- Cast Vote Records (the intended audit for tabulators)
  - MN counties refused to release them (before 2023)
  - Legislatively deemed non-public by MN law (as of 2023)



## WHY HAND COUNT?

Post-Election Review (PER) hand count does not include:

- Presidential Primary
- State Primary
- General Election
  - MN offices
  - County offices
  - Municipal offices
  - School board offices
  - Questions on the ballot

**NO AUDITS FOR  
DECADES**

**BALLOT EVIDENCE  
DESTROYED AFTER  
22 MONTHS**

voting system to determine of the counting accuracy of the voting system meets a defined standard”; and

**WHEREAS**, M.S. 206.89, subd. 3 requires a certain minimum number of **precincts** in general elections are required in this audit but no maximum is identified as follows: “The county canvassing board of a county with over 100,000 registered voters must conduct a review of a total of **at least** four precincts, or three percent of the total number of precincts in the county, whichever is greater”; and

**WHEREAS**, M.S. 206.89, subd. 3 requires a certain minimum number of **offices** in general elections to be audited via hand count but no maximum is identified as follows: “The postelection review must be conducted of the votes cast for president or governor; United States senator; and United States representative. The postelection review official may conduct postelection review of the votes cast for **additional offices**”; and

**WHEREAS**, this requirement does not apply to presidential primaries, state primaries or special elections; and

**WHEREAS**, this general election sample is usually statistically less than 0.3% of all choices made by voters in a general election and not statistically robust enough to demonstrate statistical confidence levels; and

**WHEREAS**, hand counting of ballots and votes is in the public interest to provide transparency and verification of results, deter tampering or cyberattack, restore voter confidence and promote voter participation in the electoral process; and

**WHEREAS**, the Anoka County Canvass Board meets between three and 10 days after a November state general election (204.31); and

**WHEREAS**, the County Auditor may designate the municipal clerk as the PER official within 24 hours after the county canvass of the state general election (206.89, subd. 1); and

**WHEREAS**, “the postelection review must not begin before the 11th day after the state general election and must be complete no later than the 18th day after the state general election (206.89, subd. 2); and

**BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED** that the City of \_\_\_\_\_ hereby acknowledges that the electronic voting system (“tabulation machines”) provides the certifiable basis for reporting results to the Secretary of State but any differences between the tabulation machines and the PER hand count should be taken seriously and resolved in a manner consist with the general guidelines of M.S. 206.89 and therefore duly reviewed further, if necessary, to resolve the cause of any deviations.

Adopted this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2024

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Mayor

ATTEST \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
City Clerk

(SEAL)

## WHY HAND COUNT?


The General Election Post-Election Review is a **< 0.3% sample**

- Only two or three of 30-38 offices
- Only 4 of 128 precincts

**But it can be increased**

- # offices
- # precincts

PER Sample



■ Sample ■ No Sample

**WHEREAS**, an increasingly higher percentage of \_\_\_\_\_ voters are voting early or by absentee ballot through the county which weakens the city council's ability to confidently fulfill its statutory canvassing board duties,

**NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED**, by the City Council of the City of \_\_\_\_\_ that the City Clerk is hereby directed to provide the Anoka County Elections Manager and Anoka County Auditor with notice via the Anoka County Administrator, that the \_\_\_\_\_ City Clerk intends to administer absentee voting, and also to be responsible for the administration of a ballot board for the City of \_\_\_\_\_.

Passed on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2024.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Mayor

ATTEST \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
City Administrator (SEAL)

## Municipalities Can Administer Absentee Ballots Including Mail-In Ballots

### MN Statute 203B.05

#### DESIGNATION OF MUNICIPAL CLERKS TO ADMINISTER ABSENTEE VOTING LAWS

##### § Subdivision 1. Generally.

The full-time clerk of any city or town shall administer the provisions of sections [203B.04](#) to [203B.15](#) and [203B.30](#) if:

- (1) the county auditor of that county has designated the clerk to administer them; or
- (2) the clerk has given the county auditor of that county notice of intention to administer them



# REQUESTING ANOKA COUNTY COOPERATION: RES

## #11

RESOLUTION NO. 2024-\_\_\_\_

CITY OF \_\_\_\_\_  
ANOKA COUNTY  
STATE OF MINNESOTA

### RESOLUTION REQUESTING ANOKA COUNTY TO UNDERTAKE COOPERATIVE ACTIONS IN 2024 PRIMARY & GENERAL ELECTIONS

**WHEREAS**, free and fair elections are the bedrock supporting the superstructure of our constitutional republic and local voting precincts are the building blocks of our democratic process; and

**WHEREAS**, our election system is a fair, efficient and cost-effective means to select public officials who then make decisions about government programs and services amounting to millions, billions and even trillions of dollars at all governmental levels; and

**WHEREAS**, on January 6, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated as critical infrastructure the U.S. election systems including voting machines, registration databases, polling locations and voting storage facilities thereby recognizing the need for vigilant protection from fraud, corruption and cyberattack either foreign or domestic; and

**WHEREAS**, State statutes authorize and direct counties to carry out certain local election functions; and

**WHEREAS**, counties and municipalities are authorized and directed to work together to complete certain local election functions;


**WHEREAS**, it is in the best interest of the voting public for both the County and municipalities to cooperatively employ best practices to achieve secure and transparent elections, deter tampering or cyberattack, restore voter confidence and promote voter participation in the electoral process;

# THE SOLUTION: **Locally Controlled Elections**

**Move From TODAY's Model**

**Based on MN Statute**


**To A SECURE Local Model**



## THE STRATEGY:

### County, Municipalities, and School Districts Using **their Statutory Powers**

This strategy may involve independent actions or cooperative operations under administrative or formal joint powers agreements.



Our Country has been strongest when it is governed from the bottom up, not the top down.

CITY OF RAMSEY HAND COUNT PLAN 2024

1. Number of Offices and Choices to be Counted as Per Piling System

Primary/General Office	Primary 3/5 Hand Count	Primary 8/13 Hand Count	General 11/5 Hand Count	General 11/5 Machine	If Competitive Count Need?
US President	1		1	1	Yes
US Senator		1	1	1	Yes
US Representative		1	1	1	Yes
MN Senator					
MN Representati					
Anoka Co. Board					
County SWCD					
Mayor					
Council (1) At Larg					
Council (2) Wards					
School Board					
Questions/Referre					
Supreme Court					
Court of Appeals					
10th District Court					
Total Choices Per E					

Part 1 of the Hand Count Calculator shows the structure of the ballot with offices, elections and the number of hand counts for each office. It shows the total offices and those that are not competitive, i.e. have only one candidate running.

Strategy is to hand count only competitive offices for some subset of precincts.

Hand count measures the time and number of election judges needed to hand count based upon the number of precincts and number of offices.

The spreadsheet can be used to calculate the cost of a hand count scenario with various assumptions such as number of precincts, offices and judges.

The spreadsheet calculates the cost of a hand count based on time, number of precincts and hourly rate.

The spreadsheet has been supplied to the City staff. In the future, ACEIT will conduct an analysis based on scenarios desired by the City.

CITY OF RAMSEY HAND COUNT COST ESTIMATES  
GENERAL ELECTION 2024

Hand Count Cost by Number of Precincts

Offices	# Offices	1	2	9
President, US Senate/House	3	\$255	\$510	\$2,295
Plus MN House	4	\$408	\$816	\$3,672
Plus Anoka Co. Com.	5	\$459	\$918	\$4,131
Plus SWCD	6	\$510	\$1,020	\$4,590
Plus Mayor	7	\$612	\$1,224	\$5,508
Plus Council (1-Large 2-Ward)	10	\$689	\$1,377	\$6,197
Plus ISD #728 (3, 1/2 city)	13	\$1,122	\$2,244	\$10,098
<b>Number of Ballots</b>		<b>2,008</b>	<b>4,016</b>	<b>18,073</b>

Hand Count Cost Per Ballot

Offices	# Offices	1	2	9
President, US Senate/House	3	\$0.13	\$0.13	\$0.13
Plus MN House	4	\$0.20	\$0.20	\$0.20
Plus Anoka Co. Com.	5	\$0.23	\$0.23	\$0.23
Plus SWCD	6	\$0.25	\$0.25	\$0.25
Plus Mayor	7	\$0.30	\$0.30	\$0.30
Plus Council (1-large,2-wards)	3	\$0.34	\$0.34	\$0.34
Plus ISD #728 (3, 1/2 city)	13	\$0.56	\$0.56	\$0.56

Assumptions:

1. Ballot estimate of 2020 actual x 1.1
2. Hand count only competitive offices
3. Based upon current election judge pay schedule
4. Election judge time is rounded up to full hours

ELECTION EXPENDITURES & BUDGETS

Year	2014-2024	
	Total Expense	Judges Expense
2024 Bud.	\$54,861	\$34,560
2023 Bud.	\$6,650	\$0
2022	\$44,689	\$22,261
2021	\$7,784	\$1,583
2020	\$53,763	\$34,485
2019	\$22,103	\$9,264
2018	\$59,959	\$34,516
2017	\$5,767	\$0
2016	\$69,503	\$38,804
2015	\$7,792	\$0
2014	\$46,262	\$23,418

The current ES&S DS200 computer tabulators were purchased by Anoka County in 2013 under a cost sharing Joint Powers Agreement with all municipalities and school districts in the County. They are reaching the end of their electronic life.

2. Estimate of

Factor

Total Ballots (estimate)
Number of Choices Per Precinct
Total Choices to be Counted
Seconds Per Choice
# Hours to Count
Number of Precincts
Number of Teams/Precinct
Number of Judges/Team
Run Time (Hours)
Total Number of Judges
Estimate of Total Ballots
US President Totals
US Senate Totals
US Representative Totals
*Source: Hands-On Election Administration: Organizing work, sorting


3. Estimate of

Factor

Run Time Rounded
Number of Judges
Hourly Rate
Total Cost to Count
Federal & State
County/City/SD
Judicial Offices

Cost Per Ballot	\$0.07	\$0.18	\$0.56	\$0.42	\$0.15	Calculated
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Mark Cook  
Cyber Security Expert




### Election Ecosystem: Control

	FREEDOM		DANGER		TYRANNY		FREE AGAIN	
	Precinct	County	State	Corporations	Federal	Precinct	County	
Voter Reg		PAST	CURRENT	CURRENT	PLANNED		FUTURE	
Voter Validation	PAST		CURRENT	CURRENT	PLANNED		FUTURE	
Tabulation	PAST		CURRENT	CURRENT	PLANNED		FUTURE	
Reporting		PAST	CURRENT	CURRENT	PLANNED		FUTURE	
Transparency		HIGH	CLOSE TO NONE		ZERO		100%	

*"We need to move forward to a system where our county takes back control of our election system."* — Mark Cook

6 Reasons Why Computers Should Not Be Used in Elections - Dr. Walter Daugherty

"It's almost zero transparent. Ballots go into the machine and numbers come out when you have no idea what happened in between...It's a black box."



- #### 6 Reasons Why Computers Should Not Be Used in Elections
1. No Transparency
  2. No Accountability
  3. No Reliable Accuracy Tests
  4. Vulnerable Software
  5. Vulnerable Hardware
  6. Vulnerable Networks

Dr. Walter C. Daugherty  
Senior Lecturer Emeritus  
Computer Science & Engineering  
Texas A & M University

